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ABSTRACT 
CSABA MAROSVARI: ‘Cold Reality in the Land of Fire:’ The Interrelations of 
Azerbaijan’s Natural Gas Export and Foreign Policy 
(Under the direction of David N. McNelis) 
 
Azerbaijan, a landlocked post-Soviet country since its independence has been trying to utilize 
its energy resources in its foreign policy. With production-sharing agreements with Western 
oil companies beginning with the 1994 signing of the “Contract of the Century” and the 
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline Azerbaijan successfully opened up its 
energy sector for foreign investment and used pipelines to stabilize its economy and underpin 
its foreign policy. The discovery of the Shah Deniz gas field opened up new opportunities for 
Baku to buttress its foreign policy goals with the export of natural gas. In this Master’s thesis 
I will evaluate and show the importance and significance of natural gas export in Azerbaijani 
foreign policy.  
iii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to acknowledge the guidance, support and encouragement of those without 
whom this thesis would not have been possible. I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, 
David N. McNelis, whose encouragement, guidance and support from the initial to the final 
levels enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject. I am heartily thankful to my 
thesis readers, Robert M. Jenkins and Glenn E. Schweitzer, whose critiques, advice and 
suggestions helped guide my work. I am indebted to the Chair of the Management Board of 
the Economic Research Center, Gubad Ibadoglu, who during my internship at the ERC 
supported my research, provided the center’s resources and included me in conferences and 
forums where I gained first-hand experience with Azerbaijani energy policy. I would also like 
to thank Jacqueline Olich, who provided useful suggestions about my thesis during 
finalization, as well as Sabit Bagirov, Graeme Robertson and Ilham Shaban, who contributed 
advice and remarks on the research I did on Azerbaijan’s alternative gas export options. I am 
very thankful to Natavan Khan for providing hard-to-approach sources for my work and to 
Anar Ahmadov for suggesting further contacts during my stay in Baku. I would like to show 
my gratitude to Zsolt and Karla Nagy, who with their friendly support and encouragement 
backed me throughout my graduate studies. I am particularly grateful to my parents, who 
supported and encouraged me throughout all of my studies and research. Last, I offer my 
regards and blessings to everyone who supported me in any respect during the completion of 
this project. 
iv 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................vi 
ABBREVIATIONS ...........................................................................................................vii 
Chapter 
 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
I.  DISCUSSION OF THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ..................................12 
II. AZERBAIJAN’S MULTI_VECTORAL FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
DIVERSIFICATION OF OIL EXPORT .......................................................21 
 1. Azerbaijan’s multi-vectoral foreign policy ................................................22 
 2. The diversification of oil export in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy ................24 
III. THE APPEARANCE OF NATURAL GAS IN AZERBAIJAN’S  
FOREIGN POLICY .......................................................................................31 
 1. An Old-New Natural Gas Exporter ............................................................31 
 2. Diversification of natural gas export ..........................................................34 
 3. Natural gas as a foreign policy instrument? ...............................................38 
IV. AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN AND ENERGY POLICY DECISION 
MAKING AND THE PLACE OF NATURAL GAS IN THE ENERGY 
INDUSTRY ....................................................................................................42 
 1. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy formulation and decision making system ......43 
 2. Azerbaijan’s energy policy decision making .............................................44 
 3. The role of natural gas in Azerbaijan’s policy making ..............................47 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AZERBAIJANI  
NATURAL GAS EXPORT ...........................................................................54 
 1. Georgia: a transit country of key importance and a small market ..............54 
 2. Turkey: The strategic ally, first contracted market and future transit  
state ............................................................................................................56 
v 
 
 
3. Russia: the key regional power, new export market and market competitor .. 59 
4. Iran: the controversial neighbor and new export market ................................ 62 
5. The European Union: the most desirable future market ................................. 63 
6. Azerbaijan’s alternative future market options: Syria, Ukraine ..................... 70 
7. Azerbaijan as a possible future trasnit country ............................................... 74 
 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 78 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 83 
 
  
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 
1. Azerbaijan, a landlocked natural gas exporter……………………………………..6 
2. Map of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines in the South Caucasus…………………....27 
3. Oil Production and Consumption in Azerbaijan 1985-2010………………..…….29 
4. Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Azerbaijan 1985-2010……….……33 
5. The European Southern Gas Corridor Plans……………………………………...36 
6. Azerbaijan – energy mix 1990-2010…………………………………….………..49 
7. Azerbaijan’s export revenues in 2009 by product category…...………………….51 
8. Dynamics of oil production in Azerbaijan……………………………..…………52 
9. Botas natural gas sale and purchase agreements……………………………….…57 
10. Gross inland energy consumption in the EU 27, 1999-2009……………………..64 
11. European dependence on imports of Russian natural gas in 2007………………..65 
12. European plans for the diversification of natural gas import, 2011…………..…..66 
13. Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Syria 1985-2010…………………..71 
14. Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Ukraine 1985-2010…...…………..73 
vii 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACG – Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil fields 
AGP – Arab Gas Pipeline 
AGRI – Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector 
AIOC – Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
BTC – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
BTE – Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization 
ITGI – Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy 
LNG – liquefied natural gas 
PSA – production-sharing agreement 
SEEP - South-East Europe (gas) Pipeline 
SOCAR – State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic 
SOFAZ – State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan 
TAP – Trans-Adriatic (gas) Pipeline 
TCP – Trans-Caspian (gas) Pipeline project 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Energy and energy issues have emerged as some of the most important aspects of 
security studies. The growth of energy consumption, especially in the developing economies 
of China and India since 2000, drove up oil prices and caused pricey investments in pipelines 
and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals all over the world. Although the economic crisis of 
2008–2009 had a short-term downturn effect on the world’s energy consumption,1 this seems 
to have been only a temporary phenomenon. Growth in demand is projected worldwide for 
several decades to come, despite the recent crisis. 
 Natural gas has attracted major attention within the discussion of the future of energy 
production, not only because it is a cleaner source of energy than oil or coal
2
 (emitting almost 
30 percent less carbon dioxide than oil and just under 45 percent less carbon dioxide than coal) 
but also because of its widely dispersed global locations. Thanks to the prospect of wider 
utilization of unconventional gas, despite environmental concerns about hydraulic fracturing 
technology, it is a relatively flexible, abundant resource for the expectedly booming 
international gas demand.
 3
 The effects of the Fukushima disaster of March 2011 include 
                                                             
1
 Enerdata (2011) Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2011.Source: http://yearbook.enerdata.net/. Retrieved: 16 
January 2012. 
 
2
 NaturalGas.org. http://www.naturalgas.org/environment/naturalgas.asp#greenhouse/. Retrieved: 7 November 
2008. 
3
 International Energy Agency (2011) Are We Entering a Golden Age of Gas? World Energy Outlook  2011. 
International Energy Agency, Paris. 
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increased demand for natural gas if interest in nuclear energy production declines.
 4
  The 
impact of the production of shale gas in the United States is a fact; however, whether the 
LNG oversupply to Europe will make future expensive pipeline projects commercially 
useless remains unclear.
5
  
Transportation of natural gas continues to present technical and strategic challenges. 
Despite the expansion of LNG trade, gas remains a largely regionally bound energy resource 
because the biggest volumes of gas can be most readily transported through pipelines and the 
long-term storage of large volumes of natural gas is technically impossible. Although precise 
levels of demand, consumption data and prices cannot be foreseen, natural gas will remain a 
resource of strategic and political importance. 
Within the strategic issues of energy trade, one of the most heated areas has been the 
Caspian region, a position clearly symbolized by the 2006 opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline that effectively broke Russia’s oil transit pipeline monopoly in the post-
Soviet region by carrying Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to Turkey.
6
 Azerbaijan has also 
been a focus of the debates around Caspian natural gas resources and export. 
A landlocked country since it gained independence upon the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, Azerbaijan was shattered by political and economic transitions, internal 
                                                             
4
 As a clear result of Fukushima, the federal government of Germany gave in to popular anti-nuclear feelings 
and decided to shut down all of Germany’s nuclear facilities by 2022. Kabinett beschließt Atomausstieg bis 2022, 
Die Zeit, 6 June 2011. Source: Source: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-06/atomausstieg-
energiewende-gesetzespaket. Retrieved: 6 June 2011. 
 
5
 Rogers HV, (2012) The Impact of a Globalising Market on Future European Gas Supply and Pricing: The 
Importance of Asian Demand and North American Supply, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford.  
6
 Deák AG (2008) Az EU-n kívüli térségekbe irányuló orosz szénhidrogén-export perspektívái [The Perspectives 
of Russian Hydrocarbon Exports to non-EU Regions]. In: Novák T (ed.) Kelet-Európa tanulmányok III. 
Budapest: Magyar Tudományos AkadémiaVilággazdasági Kutatóintézete, 207.  
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political turmoil and the 1988–94 war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. 7 Azerbaijan 
has been trying to utilize its energy resources to strengthen its political independence and 
create a basis for the development of its economy. With the 1994 signing of what was called 
“the Contract of the Century,” the first production-sharing agreement (PSA) with foreign 
(mostly Western) companies on the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) oil fields, Azerbaijan 
successfully opened up its energy sector to foreign investors in order to stimulate its economy 
with hydrocarbon revenues. The growing number of investments and PSAs, and their 
implementation, led to a surge in Azerbaijani oil production with a windfall of oil revenues
8
 
that stabilized the internal economic and political order.  
 The “Contract of the Century” had also important regional strategic and security 
implications. Baku’s negotiations with Western oil companies, which began as early as 1989, 
not only implied invitations to foreign capital and technology but also established the 
practical appearance of Western strategic interests in the Southern Caucasus. The 
independence of the former Soviet republics, the Nagorno-Karakakh conflict and the 
possibility of Azerbaijani oil export all made a serious impact upon the three key regional 
powers (Russia, Iran, and Turkey) as well as upon American policymaking. Russia, itself in 
turmoil at the time, tried to influence and control the political processes of the Southern 
Caucasus. Iran, a country with a significant Azeri minority, was afraid of Azerbaijani 
irredentism. Turkey was not only looking to Azerbaijani oil as a way to make itself an 
                                                             
7
 The Karabakh question continues to haunt the Azerbaijani government. The autonomous oblast of Nagorno-
Karabakh, with its Armenian majority, was part of the Azerbaijani SSR in the Soviet era. Upon the collapse of 
the USSR the Armenian population agitated for independence; by 1992 the conflict had escalated into war. By 
1994 Armenia occupied 16–18% of the area of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, a situation that caused 
the flight of more than half a million Azeri refugees (IDPs). Although a ceasefire agreement was reached in May 
1994, the Karabakh question is still a “frozen conflict” in this post-Soviet region.      
8
 Oil revenues grew from 2.97 billion USD in 2006 to 22.7 billion USD in 2010. Ibadoglu, G (2011) 
Azerbaijan’s Economic Model and Its Development Since Independence. Baku: Economic Research Center. 
Source: http://www.erc-az.org/new/uploads/file/eng1.pdf. Retrieved: 14 October 2011. 
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important energy transit hub but was also trying tried to widen its influence in the newly 
independent pos-Soviet Turkic republics. For its part, the United States wanted to strengthen 
its positions with the newly independent states in the Southern Caucasus. 
Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev (1993–2003), cognizant of the geopolitical 
realities of Azerbaijan’s landlocked location, led a pragmatic or multi-vectoral foreign policy 
based on the diversification of oil export. Multi-vectiralism, though lacking a generally 
accepted definition, is a widely used term both in media and academic sources to define the 
foreign policy strategy or behavior of especially post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, etc.) that have built strong relationship with other geopolitical actors in order to 
counterbalance Russia’s influence and enhance their own independence.9 
In partnership with Turkish and American incentives, Azerbaijan constructed the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline to export its growing oil output to world markets 
without passing through Russia or Iran. However, despite this partnership with Western 
companies, Baku cannot and has not completely turned its back on Moscow. Becasue 
Azerbaijan was compelled to use the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline as a main route for export 
until the opening of the BTC pipeline, Russia controlled much of the Azerbaijani oil exports 
between 1996 and 2006. Russia was also the main source of Azerbaijani natural gas import 
until 2007; its alliance with Armenia means that it remains the key to resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh issue.  
The PSAs that began with the “Contract of the Century” were also constructive in terms 
of natural gas. During the Soviet era, Azerbaijan had been compelled to import gas since the 
late 1980s. As a result of the discovery of the large Shah Deniz natural gas field in 1999 
                                                             
9
 Additional discussion on multi-vectoralism appears on pp. 29-31. 
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under the PSA operated by BP and Statoil, it became possible for Baku to become self-
sufficient in natural gas. When Shah Deniz launched production in 2006, Azerbaijan managed 
to realize this goal. In addition, after the opening in 2007 of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) 
gas pipeline, which was constructed parallel to the BTC, Azerbaijan was not only able to 
suspend natural gas imports from Russia and become completely independent of Russian 
hydrocarbon supplies but also began to export natural gas to Georgia and Turkey. Especially 
after the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006,
10
 Azerbaijan was seen by the European Union as 
the keystone of its natural gas import diversification efforts in the Caspian region (later 
known as the European Southern Gas Corridor).  
Azerbaijan was amenable to these European ambitions because the construction of 
pipelines to Europe fit its multi-vectoral foreign policy. The establishment of natural gas 
export to Europe would bring several benefits to Azerbaijan. First, it would mean a real 
diversification of natural gas export, similar to oil, which would lead to a breakout from the 
current regional infrastructural-geographical constraints of Azerbaijan’s gas pipelines to 
Russia, Iran and Turkey (through Georgia). Second, in contrast to Iran, Russia or even Turkey, 
countries that have past
11
 as well as future capabilities of direct interference, Europe may 
provide a far-reaching and well-paying
12
 but politically not-too-interfering partner. Third, 
                                                             
10
 The 2006 gas crisis was a result of a long debate between Russia and Ukraine on the gas price hike for 
Ukraine by Gazprom as well as Ukraine’s inability to pay and Russian allegiations of Gazprom gas stolen from 
Ukrainian storages. On January 1, 2006 Gazprom reduced pressure in pipelines to Ukraine that led to the cut of 
Russian gas supply through Ukraine to Europe.  
11
 Cornell SE (2011) Azerbaijan Since Independence. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 70–87. 
12
 Post-Soviet gas exporter states have long wished for “European” netback prices, although the prices of natural 
gas trade in the CIS were lower than the European prices. Moscow has been in control of the transit routes of gas 
from Central Asian producers (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to other CIS countries and Europe, which has 
enabled Russia to procure gas cheaply and to re-export it to Europe for hard currency. Due to the economic 
crisis, however, many other CIS gas importers have also been unable to pay netback prices to exporters. 
Therefore, since the early 1990s the key strategic goal of post-Soviet gas exporters has been to reap “European” 
netback prices from their CIS partners. See: Miyamoto A (1998) Natural Gas in Central Asia: Industries, 
6 
 
 
European plans to import natural gas from Central Asia are set to transform Azerbaijan into a 
transit country of key strategic importance.  
However, due in part to difficulties with the implementation of the European gas 
pipelines, Baku has also been looking to non-European markets to further diversify export.
13
 
Azerbaijan began to export natural gas to Russia in 2009 and in January 2011 signed a 5-year 
export contract with Iran. Azerbaijan also plans to export natural gas to Syria through Turkey 
and has begun negotiations on LNG exports to Ukraine through Georgia.   
 
1. Azerbaijan, a landlocked natural gas exporter 
“Energy producers seek security of demand so that national budgets can anticipate a 
steady and predictable revenue flow,” noted Gal Luft and Anne Korin (2009).14 Substantial 
reserves of natural gas (particularly when some of them are intended for export) and a need 
for security of demand have two implications: geopolitical and commercial. Beyond the basic 
common understanding of geopolitics as the impact of geographical factors on policy making, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Markets and Export Options of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 7. 
13
 ten Hoedt R (2010). ’We do not want to depend only on one pipeline’ Interview: Azerbaijani top negotiator 
Elshad Nassirov, European Energy Review. Source: 
http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=2528. Retrieved: 15 November 2010.  
14
 Luft G and Korin A (eds.) (2009) Introduction. In: Luft G and Korin A (eds.) Energy Security Challenges for 
the 21
st
 Century. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 9. 
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Joe Barnes et al. (2006) defined the geopolitics of gas as “not simply an endless jockeying for 
global position, but also the immensely political actions of governments, investors, and other 
key actors who decide which gas trade projects will be built, how the gains will be allocated 
and how the risks of dependence on international trading will be managed.”15 Regarding 
Caspian natural gas trade, the basic premises of geopolitics are still true. Because the 
technical difficulties of natural gas trade (pipeline and LNG) and the issue of transit countries 
are interrelated, geopolitical situations are important determinants for the formulation of 
natural gas trade of landlocked countries that, like Azerbaijan, have abundant gas resources.  
Foreign policy also must contend with the constraints of geopolitics. As a newly 
independent, landlocked post-Soviet country endowed with not insignificant hydrocarbon 
resources and a largely energy revenue-dependent economy, Azerbaijan faced a complex 
problem stemming from its very location. Although Baku did gain independence from Russia, 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have remained complex. For example, Moscow supported 
Azerbaijan’s adversary in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, sought to restore its influence in 
the Southern Caucasus, intervened in Azerbaijani domestic politics in the early 1990s, was 
the source of import of natural gas and controlled all of the transit routes for Azerbaijani oil. 
In response, Azerbaijani leadership has been compelled to seek a breakout from their 
country’s geographically landlocked situation in order to strengthen the country’s 
independence, even as they have formulated the rest of their foreign policies.  
Azerbaijan has used the diversification of oil export routes, with the involvement of 
Western companies, to emphasize its independence and create a basis for its development 
                                                             
15
 Barnes J et al. (2006). Introduction. In: Victor DG, Jaffe M and Hayes MH (eds.) Natural Gas and 
Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5. 
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through oil revenues. Given the even bigger challenges posed by technical hurdles and the 
need to consider the strategic value of transit infrastructure, natural gas may turn out to be a 
useful instrument for Baku to strengthen its regional positions against its powerful neighbors. 
It will be particularly useful if Russia and Iran counter these efforts by “bringing” the 
European Union to the Southern Caucasus through pipeline connections, diversifying further 
to the Middle East (and, possibly, Ukraine). Even so, Azerbaijan has the valuable option of 
becoming a transit country for Central Asian natural gas.  
The direct connection of infrastructure would not mean active leverage or involvement 
of partners in the region. Instead, a direct connection would more passively confer leverage 
upon Baku if a regional event threatens the security of energy transport between Azerbaijan 
and its markets (primarily Europe). The geopolitical implications are clear, given the fact that 
Azerbaijan is a landlocked country that must build pipelines to its markets through transit 
states. These implications, although they seem evident, are also too determinative. 
Commercial implications mean the financially measurable gains and losses from natural 
gas production and export. These, at first glance, do not seem to be as obvious as the 
geopolitical implications. In 2009, Azerbaijan’s export revenues from natural gas had a 
marginal share of all exports, 1 percent, compared to oil revenue’s 92 percent share. 16 
However, Azerbaijan’s oil output is expected to near its peak before 2015.17 Because of key 
structural problems in the economy that stem from overdependence upon oil,
18
 Baku is 
                                                             
16
 Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan 2010. 2010,Baku: State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, 639–651. 
17
 Centre for Global Energy Studies (21 July 2011). Azerbaijan’s oil output begins to slip. Source: 
http://www.cges.co.uk/resources/articles/2011/07/13/azerbaijan%E2%80%99s-oil-output-begins-to-slip. 
Retrieved: 19 January 2011. 
18
 Ibadoglu, G (2011). Azerbaijan’s Economic Model and Its Development Since Independence. Baku: Economic 
Research Center. Source: http://www.erc-az.org/new/uploads/file/eng1.pdf. Retrieved: 14 October 2011. 
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motivated to find a new strategic commodity to sell and thereby to gain a new source of 
export revenues. By 2035,
19
 Azerbaijan’s export potential is estimated at 35 billion m3 
annually; an estimate that reveals the growing importance of natural gas to the country’s 
economy. Nonetheless, whether natural gas really has the relatively marginal role it seems to 
have now, and whether the diversification of natural gas export is a geopolitical strategy-
driven measure, are not known. The role that future natural gas exports will play in 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has yet to be determined as well. Nor is it known whether 
Azerbaijan, despite its multi-vectoral approach, still looks to Europe as a primary market for 
its natural gas export.  The the purely commercial reasons for Baku to expedite natural export 
in the near future also have yet to be discovered.     
In this thesis I will evaluate and show the importance and significance of natural gas 
export to Azerbaijani foreign policy. My hypothesis is that, due to strategic reasons embedded 
in its multi-vectoral foreign policy, Baku intends to use the diversification of natural gas 
export in a similar way as it did with oil. However, natural gas export, due to its 
infrastructural restrictions, may have much more direct strategic security implications than oil 
export has had. Although Baku is pursuing a multi-vectoral foreign policy, given the 
constraints of its regional geopolitical situation, in the long term Baku will move closer to a 
well-paying, less interventionist partner like the European Union rather than closer neighbors 
that have historically been interventional. Mutual interest in natural gas trade between 
                                                             
19
 International Energy Agency (15 March 2011).  Caspian oil and gas exports are poised for take-off. Source: 
http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1881. Retrieved: 13 June 2011. 
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Azerbaijan and the European Union gives Baku leverage and increases its (geo)political 
value, especially with the transit option of Central Asian natural gas. 
However, the commercial importance of natural gas in the form of additional revenues 
is also an important factor. Not only are foreign investors expecting profit, but the oil-
dependent Azerbaijani economy may also need new sources of income to mitigate the decline 
of oil revenues. In addition, even if Azerbaijan does look for other natural gas markets in the 
future, the establishment of European gas trade (which entails a closer relationship with an 
extra-regional, non-interfering mentor) remains of primary importance.  
I argue that although the strategic, geopolitical reasons behind Azerbaijani export 
projects (especially to Europe) seem to play a primary role, yet commercial reasons have the 
same importance given the considerable income energy export means for the Azerbaijani 
economy. Multi-vectoral foreign policy, with its strategic implications underpinned by energy 
export policy, serves also a commercially successful energy export strategy that underpins 
foreign policy goals, so basically energy export-related foreign policy in Azerbaijan in many 
ways also means foreign economic policy as foreign policy strategy and commercial 
interestss in energy export are actually hard to distinguish from each other. Even if natural 
gas may not be as commercially significant to Azerbaijan as oil has been, its overall 
importance should not be underestimated. In contrast to the diversification of oil export, 
however, the issue of natural gas export in Azerbaijani foreign policy has rarely been 
discussed by scholars. In this thesis I take a closer look at the role natural gas export may play 
in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy strategy by applying the model of Azerbaijani oil export 
diversification and its role in the foreign policy to natural gas export diversification and its 
foreign policy implications. 
11 
 
 
 Chapter 1 contains my methodological approach to the evaluation of the role of 
natural gas in Azerbaijani foreign policy. Chapter 2 examines the Azerbaijani oil export 
diversification strategy and its foreign policy implications, especially within the multi-
vectoral foreign policy Azerbaijan has pursued since 1993. Chapter 3 includes an analysis of 
whether and to what extent strategic interests in the utilization of Azerbaijani natural gas 
export are analogous to strategic interests in the utilization of oil export in the 1990s. Chapter 
4 considers the connections and decision-making system of Azerbaijani foreign policy and 
energy policy making, as well as the role of natural gas in Azerbaijani energy policy. Finally, 
Chapter 5 traces the international implications of Azerbaijani natural gas export. 
  
CHAPTER 1 
DISCUSSION OF THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
The ultimate goal of this project is the evaluation of the importance and significance 
of natural gas export within Azerbaijani foreign policy. Foreign investment and the 
diversification of oil export have played key roles in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy since 1991. 
Undoubtedly the beginning of negotiations with foreign oil companies in 1989, the “Contract 
of the Century” in 1994, the growing oil production and the diversification of oil export, 
especially the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, have played a crucial role 
in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The surge in oil revenues that resulted from the growing oil 
production and export and the fortuitous coincidence of oil price hikes in the 2000s not only 
stabilized Azerbaijan’s international and regional positions, but also, having flooded the state 
budget with petrodollars, stabilized the internal political and economic order. The “Contract 
of the Century” and the role of oil export diversification in Azerbaijan’s multi-vectoral 
foreign policy strategy have been widely discussed in the academic literature. 
Despite the fact that many observers of Azerbaijan still consider natural gas to be less 
significant than oil, this thesis is based on the hypothesis that, with its geopolitical and 
commercial implications, natural gas is of much greater importance for Baku’s future foreign 
policy making than is now acknowledged.  Therefore, herein I examine whether the model of 
oil export diversification in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy may be applicable to Azerbaijan’s 
13 
 
 
natural gas export strategy, and if so, what common implications and differences can be 
noted.   
Azerbaijan is bordered by the Caspian Sea to its east and by Russia, Iran, Georgia, 
Turkey and Armenia. As Brenda Shaffer (2009) observed,
 20
 six permanent factors have 
influenced the foreign policies of Azerbaijan since the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 
declared its independence from the former Soviet Union in 1918 (on roughly the same 
territory as the current Republic of Azerbaijan). First is the country’s landlocked geographical 
location, which creates obstacles in foreign trade and presents challenges to the formation of 
foreign policy toward neighboring countries. Second is Azerbaijan’s strategic location 
between Europe and Asia and its energy riches. Third is Azerbaijan’s small size compared to 
its three major regional power neighbors (Russia, Turkey and Iran). Fourth is Azerbaijan’s 
role as a major oil and gas exporter and the foreign policy opportunities and constraints that 
accompany it. Fifth is the contested borders between the states of the Caucasus. Sixth is the 
fact that the majority of the Azerbaijani ethnic group lives primarily in Iran.
21
   
These six factors all include geographical aspects such as location, neighbors, and 
resources. Lack of ocean access and energy resources are also highly relevant, as Avinoam 
Idnan and Brenda Shaffer (2011) noted.
22
 Landlocked states have much less maneuverability 
and narrower policy spheres, which in turn affect their foreign policy decisions. Energy 
exporters, which are additionally burdened by the issues of energy transit, attempt to establish 
                                                             
20
 Shaffer B (2009) Permanent Factors in Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy. In: Ismailzade F and Petersen A (eds.) 
Azerbaijan in Global Politics: Crafting Foreign Policy. Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 68.  
21
 Shaffer B (2009) Permanent Factors in Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy. In: Ismailzade F and Petersen A (eds.) 
Azerbaijan in Global Politics: Crafting Foreign Policy. Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 69.  
22
 Idnan A and Shaffer B (2011). The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States. Post-Soviet Affairs, 
27(3): 243–247. 
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a multi-directional or multi-vectoral foreign policy. Azerbaijan’s multi-vectoral approach is 
indicated in three areas of its foreign policy: the establishment of multiple oil export pipelines 
and the creation of distinctive approaches to transit states and transportation issues.
23
  
Energy and energy transport have been of paramount strategic importance for 
Azerbaijan. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Mammadguliyev (2009), these 
factors represent the backbone of the country’s national development. 24  Azerbaijan has 
utilized its energy resources to rebuild and develop its economy as well as to stabilize its 
internal stability and political independence. One of the key objectives of Azerbaijan’s 
foreign economic policy is to ensure that Azerbaijan is an important and active participant in 
the new international energy security architecture. The development of transport 
infrastructure is considered a priority of Azerbaijan’s national development strategy, 
especially because of its potential to link Central Asia and Europe.
25
  
As Indra Overland stated, cooperation with the West may be important for Caspian 
energy producers from many aspects. For example, meetings with Western diplomats and 
leaders can raise the domestic legitimacy of Caspian leaders and their countries’ international 
profile; for its part, the West can provide a relatively stable energy market as well as capital 
technology and organizational skills.
26
 Although the awareness of the West about democracy 
in the Caspian region may sometimes become an irritant, the history of democracy in the 
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region shows that realist geopolitical, strategic interests have easily overwritten its ideals.
27
 
Russia’s own realist attitudes about non-democratic domestic political life and geographical 
proximity, as well as its need for cooperation from its neighbors and partners, is a basic 
reality for Caspian energy exporters such as Azerbaijan. Moscow, seeking to gain influence, 
“may be too close for comfort.”28 
Azerbaijan has used its oil resources to strengthen its independence, especially from 
Russia. As Adam Stulberg noted, although Russia has been trying to utilize its energy 
resources and control over the transit infrastructures of other post-Soviet countries’ energy 
exports, Azerbaijan’s oil expoert strategy went beyond market and utility maximization. 
Political-strategic motives, more than commercial interests when oil prices were low, caused 
Azerbaijani leadership to back the BTC pipeline (as a popular slogan of the 1990s phrased it, 
“Happiness is multiple pipelines”). It was strategically both logical and desirable for Baku to 
support the BTC, a decision strongly backed by the United States that meant independence 
from the Russian transit system.
29
 
The first task of this thesis is to analyze Azerbaijan as a landlocked post-Soviet energy 
producer. Geopolitics, as the expression of relationships among foreign policy, political 
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power and the physical environment, has been considered to be a useful framework through 
which to examine energy security and policy making, particularly as the location of energy 
resources and transportation issues impact interested states’ foreign policies.30 The following 
chapters examine more specific questions. Chapter 2 considers how Azerbaijan has used its 
oil resources in its geographically constrained location, the meaning of Azerbaijani multi-
vectoral foreign policy, how Azerbaijan’s positions change after signing “the Contract of the 
Century” in 1994, and how the growing production of oil and the growth of oil revenues in 
Azerbaijan transformed the geopolitical picture of the Caspian region. In Chapter 3, I discuss 
how natural gas might be of similar strategic value for Azerbaijan as oil has been. 
Geographical location and geographically defined policy choices are only one side of 
the issue, however. As such they are relevant to the ways that mostly external, physical 
factors affect strategies, choices and decisions. Beyond the undeniable impacts of external 
factors upon natural gas export, which are certainly important because markets, transit routes, 
infrastructure, security and financing have to be taken into account, we must also examine 
how and in what way the decisions of Azerbaijani political leaders are made. As Güner 
Özkan (2006) stated, even though Azerbaijani policy makers have been aware of the foreign 
political usefulness of energy resources since independence, the development of energy 
resources by multinational oil companies cannot be divorced from internal issues and 
especially not from internal security issues.
31
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In order to better understand the connections between natural gas and foreign policy, 
in Chapter 4 I will review the political economy of natural gas in Azerbaijan, for example 
where and how foreign policy and energy policy decisions (especially production-sharing 
agreements, export, etc.) are made, which players have decisive roles in making the decisions, 
how decisions have been made in oil and gas PSAs, and how infrastructure projects, 
especially gas pipeline projects, have been decided. I also discuss the role of  natural gas in 
the Azerbaijani energy mix and expected revenue volume.   
Energy issues and politics are so strongly interconnected as to be inseparable; as 
Shaffer observed, energy supply is an integral part of the foreign and national politics of 
states.
32
 Energy for energy exporters and transit states alike is as much a part of their policy 
arsenals as other economic tools, military power and diplomatic relations. Infrastructure 
projects link states and also reflect the quality of their relations. Natural gas is not only the 
center of energy security policies, natural gas trade is more vulnerable than oil to political 
influence.
33
 While the world oil market is well established, natural gas markets are still 
regionally fragmented (despite the expansion of LNG trade) because the delivery of gas is 
mostly bound to pipelines and to cross-border relations. This situation means that gas 
exporters, transit countries and markets are interdependent. 
Furthermore, as Réka Szemerkényi (2007) also noted, within the strategy of energy 
exporter countries the utilization of the commercial advantages of energy export revenues is 
an instrument, not a goal; for these countries, energy policy is an “applied policy” for the 
                                                             
32
 Shaffer B (2009) Energy Politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1–3. 
 
33
 Shaffer B (2009) Energy Politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1–3. 
18 
 
 
achievement of goals in other policy fields.
34
 As Heidi Kjaernet (2010) described, energy 
plays a key role in the “economization of foreign policy.” In other words, the utilization of 
energy sources serves as economic leverage for foreign policy goals (for example, how 
Russia has utilized energy as a leverage against many of its partners and how Azerbaijan has 
been trying to use it for its interests in the Southern Caucasus).
35
 
In order to evaluate the significance of natural gas within Azerbaijani foreign policy, 
we must consider the international implications of Azerbaijani natural gas export, 
Azerbaijan’s existing natural gas export markets (e.g., Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Iran), and 
its possible future export markets (the European Union, Syria, Jordan and Ukraine).  This 
thesis analyzes the key meeting and sticking points of interest between Baku and Azerbaijan’s 
current and possible natural gas trade partners, in order to explicate the basis for current 
Azerbaijani gas export, and a commodity for export, how natural gas trade relations came into 
existence and what role natural gas has played in these interstate relations.  
The first places to look for answers are the current and potential transit countries. For 
landlocked Caspian energy exporting states, as Nikolai Dobronravin (2008) explained, the 
“transit curse” affects the development of all countries located between modern-day Russia 
and the southern border of the former Soviet Union. These countries aspire to bypass Russia 
and become the “window on Europe” because transit through Russia would significantly raise 
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the costs of oil or gas without any real profit for the producers.
36
 However, as he also noted, 
the development of inter alia Azerbaijan depends as much (although not more) on the 
political and economic decisions of the transit countries as on similar decisions by the EU 
countries.
37
 Transit is clearly one of the key issues in the implementation of Azerbaijan’s gas 
export projects; an additional factor is that transit countries may also be consumers. Turkey’s 
role is of particular importance given its potentially growing natural gas consumption and its 
location for the transit of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe. 
In evaluating the meeting and sticking points between the interests of Azerbaijan and 
its partners to establish the trade of natural gas, the pipeline projects that are debated and the 
energy aspects of interstate relations regarding future natural gas trade are salient issues. In 
order to fully understand these issues, we must ask what role natural gas plays in the economy 
of the current and future possible partners; why have these partners been or would they be 
interested in Azerbaijani natural gas; what is the method of transit; what strategic and 
financial implications are there regarding the implementation; and how have these 
implications affected/may affect Azerbaijan’s positions. 
Finally, we also have to acknowledge the possibility that Azerbaijan itself may 
become a transit country for Central Asian natural gas––a transit position that may be even 
more complicated if Azerbaijan also becomes a fellow supplier of natural gas (the same role 
to which Central Asian countries aspire). Although many issues surround the question of 
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Trans-Caspian gas trade and transit, given its implications for Azerbaijani relations with 
Turkmenistan in particular, possibility of this dual role must be examined.  
If the geopolitical importance of building natural gas pipelines and foreign policy 
goals overlap the same way as they did in the case of oil export (as discussed in chapters 2–3), 
the commercial importance of natural gas may also have a central domestic political role 
(Chapter 4), particularly if real demand for Azerbaijani natural gas continues in Europe and 
other regions and the various transit and the infrastructural projects are both politically and 
commercially feasible (Chapter 5).    
  
  
CHAPTER 2 
AZERBAIJAN’S MULTI-VECTORAL FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
DIVERSIFICATION OF OIL EXPORT 
 
Azerbaijan historically has been an energy exporter. Half of the world’s oil output was 
produced in Baku in the early 20th century.
38
 Despite the gradual decline of production late in 
the Soviet era, Azerbaijan has been considered to be a country with potential opportunities for 
development. 
Since declaring its independence upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Azerbaijan has been trying to utilize its energy resources to strengthen its political 
independence; specifically, to create a basis for the development of its economy from 
hydrocarbon revenues. With the 1994 signing of “the Contract of the Century,” the first 
production-sharing agreement (PSA) about the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) oil fields 
entered into with foreign (mostly Western) companies, Azerbaijan has successfully opened up 
its energy sector for foreign investors.  President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003) 
and his son and successor Ilham Aliyev (2003-) have led a multi-vectoral foreign policy that 
was primarily based on the diversification of oil export.  
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2.1. Azerbaijan’s multi-vectoral foreign policy 
Multi-vectoral, multi-directional, multi-dimensional, balanced or pragmatic are all 
terms that are widely used in official statements, as well as in academic literature and news 
articles, to define the foreign policy strategy or behavior of post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, etc.). An exact definition of “multi-vectoral,” however, has not yet 
been reached. 
To some degree, almost every country that maintans foreign relations with more than 
one other country employs a multi-vectoral foreign policy in the most basic sense: it has 
relations, or interactions, with countries other than itself. The term appears in common usage 
to address the very political stance of a country that is described by Idnan and Shaffer (2011) 
as to “refrain from joining exclusive alliance systems and maintain cooperation with 
competing alliance systems.”39  By Ariel Cohen’s (2008) definition, multi-vectoral means 
“bilateral relations with each geopolitical actor, and [the avoidance of] sacrificing one vector 
for the sake of the other.”40 Bhavna Dave (2007) describes countries with multi-vectoral 
foreign policy not as „attaching priority to a single country” but rather “geared at developing 
close partnerships with all of [their] neighbours and an active engagement in multilateral 
regional organisations.” 41  These definitions contain notions of balance, cooperation, 
partnership and lack of exclusivity from or priority for one over another partner nation or 
other entity. For a country with the location and the size of Azerbaijan, multi-vectoral means 
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reactive, adaptive policy making as well as responding to the circumstances and the moves of 
powerful players beyond its borders. 
 These priorities also appear in Azerbaijan’s National Security Concept statement 
(2007), whch emphasizes “the independence, territorial integrity and democratic development 
of the country, integration into the Euro-Atlantic area as the strategic choice, and 
multidimensional and balanced foreign policy.” The document also stresses the importance of 
relations with its neighbors and the European Union and states that “close cooperation of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan with the European Union will contribute to the stability in the 
Caucasus and will promote the European values in the region.”42 
For landlocked energy producer countries, a multi-vectoral strategic orientation and 
multiple export pipelines are key components of foreign policy.
43
 Therefore, energy and 
energy resources have been closely interconnected within Azerbaijani foreign policy. Not 
only has Azerbaijan been utilizing its energy resources to rebuild and develop its economy as 
well as stabilize its internal stability and political independence, the development of transport 
infrastructure is also considered to be a priority of national development strategy––especially 
because of Azerbaijan’s potential to link Central Asia and Europe.44  
After independence, during the short tenure of President Ayaz Mutallibov (1991–92) 
Azerbaijan maintained a pro-Moscow stance. During the first democratically elected 
government, that of President Abulfaz Elcibey and the Azerbaijani Popular Front (1992–93), 
a foreign policy line developed that was pro-Western and pro-Turkish but anti-Russian and 
                                                             
42
 National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan (23 May 2007). Source: 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Azerbaijan2007.pdf. Retrieved: 15 January 2012. 
43
 Idnan A and Shaffer B (2011) The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States. Post-Soviet Affairs, 
27(3): 243–247. 
44
 Mammadguliyev M (2009) Azerbaijan’s Foreign Economic Relations. In: Ismailzade F and Petersen A (eds.) 
Azerbaijan in Global Politics: Crafting Foreign Policy. Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 199– 215. 
24 
 
 
anti-Iranian. Since the fall of Elcibey
45
 and Heydar Aliyev’s rise to power (1993), however, 
Azerbaijan has maintained a multi-vectoral foreign policy that is manifested in two major 
areas. 
First was the implementation of the strategy of having fair relations with Russia, 
which has been the key ally of Armenia and thus the key to the settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh issue. Maintaining access to Karabakh is vital because of its history as the main 
source of Azerbaijani natural gas import; given Azerbaijan’s landlockedness, if Moscow 
controls Karabakh it also controls Azerbaijani energy transit. Second, following Elcibey’s 
line, Western companies became involved in the development of the Azerbaijani energy 
industry and U.S.-backed oil export pipelines began to be constructed in order to break 
Russia’s control over the transit routes of Azerbaijani oil export.  Clearly, access to oil and 
the ability to transport it were central issues in Azerbaijan’s early foreign policy strategy. 
 
2.2. The diversification of oil in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy46 
In the wake of the economic collapse of Azerbaijan in 1991-95, which can be 
attributed to its post-Soviet transition and the Nagorno-Karabakh war,
47
 the revitalization of 
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the Azerbaijani economy and the stabilization of both its external independence and internal 
order have been of primary urgency. As a result, presidents Elcibey andAliyev both decided 
to open up its energy resources for foreign (mostly Western) investors.
48
 In the opinions of 
Azerbaijan’s strategy makers, foreign investment would not only bring essential capital and 
state of-the-art technology for the development of hard-to-approach offshore oil and natural 
gas fields, it would also give Baku leverage against its neighbors (especially Russia, which 
was reluctant to accept the independence of South Caucasus countries).
49
  
On September 20, 1994, Baku signed the so-called “Contract of the Century,” the first 
production-sharing agreement (PSA) with the Azerbaijani International Operating Company 
(AIOC), a consortium made up of 11 companies that were drilling the large Azeri, Chirag and 
Guneshli (ACG) offshore oil fields. Before 2000 this contract had been followed by 18 more 
PSAs.
50
 
As the development of the ACG fields was expected to increase Azerbaijani oil output, 
it was crucial for Baku to arrange satisfactory transit for the country’s oil export. Despite the 
participation of Lukoil in the “Contract of the Century,” Russia tended to oppose51 offshore 
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Azerbaijani explorations in the Caspian. Moscow’s disapproval and attempt to exert control 
over Azerbaijani energy transport was expressed in its proposal of what was at the time the 
only possible export route for Azeri oil: the existing Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which led 
to a deepwater harbor. In 1996 the Baku leadership agreed to export via that pipeline but was 
already searching for non-Russian export routes.
52
  
Fearing irredentism in Baku, Iran (the southern neighbor with a vast Azeri minority) 
also viewed Azeri plans to tap oil and natural gas fields under the Caspian Sea with suspicion 
and moreover resented any Azerbaijani oil and gas exploration in the Caspian Sea because of 
unresolved border issues. Furthermore, Western involvement in the development of an 
Azerbaijani energy industry meant U.S. pressure to exclude not only Iranian firms from the 
projects but also Iran itself from accessing the transit pipelines.
53
  
Beyond its cultivation of an exceptionally positive relationship with the Turkic-
speaking Azerbaijan, Turkey also had interests in the Azerbaijani resources. These interests 
were based not only in Turkey’s consideration of its own dependence on energy resources, 
but also in its interest in building an export pipeline that would transport landlocked 
Azerbaijani and possibly Central Asian oil to a Turkish deepwater port. Beyond its plans to 
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become an important oil transit country, Ankara also considered energy trade to be an 
important facilitator of postive relations with the Turkic-speaking nations of the Caspian.
54
   
The United States also recognized a new opportunity in Azerbaijani hydrocarbon 
production. Washington, especially during the Clinton administration (1992–2000), perceived 
that through helping to transport landlocked Azerbaijan’s oil production to world markets via 
pipelines that bypassed Russia and Iran, it could help to create more stability and peace in the 
Caspian region.
55
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines in the South Caucasus 
Map created by A.Y. Deezy 
Source: http://ay-deezy.deviantart.com/art/South-Caucasus-Pipelines-186805101?q=&qo  
In the late 1990s the U.S. backed several pipeline projects for the transport of oil (and 
later, natural gas) from Azerbaijan to world markets without passing through Russia (Figure 
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2). The first project, in 1999, was the restoration/construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil 
pipeline, which carries a limited amount of Azerbaijani oil to the Georgian coast.
56
 The more 
ambitious Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was meant to transport Azerbaijani oil to 
world markets.  
Azerbaijan backed the BTC pipeline for of political-strategic reasons (as exemplified in 
the slogan, “Happiness is multiple pipelines”) more than commercial interests when oil prices 
were low. Of course, the shortest route of oil export to world markets would have been 
through Iran, but this option was not viable because of U.S. opposition and unstable relations 
between Baku and Tehran. Thus the existing Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline provided the 
cheapest option. However, Azerbaijani leadership was also deeply concerned about Russia’s 
control over the pipelines and the volatile pricing policy set by Russian energy transit system 
operator Transneft. For these reasons it was strategically logical and desirable for the most 
expensive and longest BTC pipeline to symbolize independence from the Russian transit 
system; therefore, this plan was strongly backed by the United States.
57
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3. Oil Production and Consumption in Azerbaijan 1985-2010 
58
 
Source of Data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy Historical Data. 
 
The “Contract of the Century” and the PSAs made it possible for the Azerbaijani 
government to easily utilize its hydrocarbon resources and also to exploit their international 
importance for three foreign-oriented aims: 1) to cement its independence in the face of its 
powerful neighbors; 2) to put pressure on Armenia to return the occupied Azerbaijani 
territories; and 3) to diversify its oil distribution to world markets completely free of Russian 
control of transit routes and materials.
59
 Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, increases in oil 
production and export not only paved the way to the stabilization of Azerbaijan’s 
independence and provided the bedrock for its multi-vectoral foreign policy line but also 
sparked the revival of the Azerbaijani oil sector. Thanks to the oil price hike in the 2000s that 
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resulted in the surge of oil revenues,
60
 oil production and export growth became a useful 
instrument for the political leadership in Baku to stabilize the country’s internal politics.61 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE APPEARANCE OF NATURAL GAS EXPORT IN AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN 
POLICY 
 
The commission of the BTC oil pipeline in 2006 fulfilled the objectives of 
Azerbaijan’s oil export diversification strategy. The new pipeline would not only enable 
Azerbaijan to open up a main transit route for its oil export to the world market that bypassed 
Russia and Iran, it would also bring in enormous revenue by transporting growing volumes of 
oil. The year 2006, however, also meant the beginning of a new era when the simultaneous 
construction of the BTE gas pipeline and the start of production in the Shah Deniz gas field 
turned Azerbaijan from a net importer into a net exporter of natural gas and freed Baku from 
increasingly expensive Russian import. The growing interest of the European Union in 
diversifying its own natural gas import after the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis dovetailed 
with Azerbaijan’s need to find export markets for its growing gas output.62  
 
3.1.  An Old-New Natural Gas Exporter  
Natural gas has been produced in Azerbaijan in the form of associated gas since the 
1930s; its first gas field, the Bakhar, was opened in the mid-1950s. Azerbaijan was the largest 
gas producer within the USSR in the 1940s, but its relative share began to decline due to the 
                                                             
62
 Azerbaijan offers to sell gas to Europe. Financial Times, 27 May 2006. Source: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b969395e-ed1c-11da-a307-0000779e2340.html#axzz1jf12YgUh. Retrieved: 15 
January 2012. 
32 
 
 
“gas revolution” of the 1950s when the first Russian and Ukrainian fields were opened.63  By 
1965, gas produced in the Azerbaijani SSR still supplied 10 percent of the entire Soviet 
output,
64
 but in the 1960s the development of Central Asian fields and the giant fields of 
Western Siberia lowered the importance of Azerbaijani gas. Although gas generally played a 
secondary role to oil in the republic's energy industry, since the 1970s the energy mix began 
to shift to gas consumption. In the early 1970s the Soviets built a pipeline from Astara to Iran 
to cover the growing demand for gas from Iranian sources in the Caucasus, but this supply 
ceased after the Islamic revolution of 1979. By the 1980s, despite the decline in Azerbaijani 
gas production (Figure 4), natural gas emerged as the most important primary source of the 
Azerbaijani power supply. This centrality was compromised in 1987 when the Soviets 
constructed the Hajigabul-Mozdok gas pipeline to carry gas from the Russian SFR and 
Turkmen SSR.
65
 
                                                             
63
 Bowden J (2009) Azerbaijan: From gas importer to exporter. In: Pirani SM (ed.) Russian and CIS Gas 
Markets and their Impact on Europe. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 206. 
64
 Radó S (ed.) (1967) Nemzetközi Almanach 1967. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 943. 
65
 In 1990 gas comprised more than 61 percent of the Azerbaijani energy mix. Bowden J (2009) Azerbaijan: 
from gas importer to exporter. In: Parani SM (ed.) Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their Impact on Europe. 
Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 207–208. 
33 
 
 
 
4. Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Azerbaijan 1985-2010 
66
 
Source of Data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy Historical Data.
 67
 
After gaining independence from Russia in 1991 and subsequently opening up its 
hydrocarbon industry to foreign investors in order to stabilize its economy and positions 
against its powerful neighbors, Azerbaijan became party to a new source of revenue in 1999 
when the PSA, led by BP and Statoil, discovered Shah Deniz—a new, relatively big68 natural 
gas offshore field that was eventually found to contain not only enough resources to cover the 
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country’s domestic needs but also to provide substantial volumes of gas for export. In 2001 
this potential revenue stream began to pay off when Turkey contracted for 6.6 billion m
3
/year 
of Azerbaijani natural gas.
69
 On the strength of this contract, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas 
pipeline project was submitted to the U.S.-backed BTC oil pipeline project. As a result, in 
2006 the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline was constructed in a geographically and timely 
parallel with the BTE oil pipeline to supply the Turkish market. 
In 2006 the first stage of the Shah Deniz field was put under operation and the BTE 
pipeline was commissioned as well. At the same time, for 2007 Gazprom raised its post-
Soviet gas export prices close to its export prices for European countries that meant a twofold 
hike in gas prices inter alia for Azerbaijan.
70
 Thanks to the development of Shah Deniz, 
however, Azerbaijan opted to suspend natural gas imports from Russia. Thus the BTE gas 
pipeline (similarly to the BTC oil pipeline) broke Russia’s monopoly on the future transit of 
Azerbaijani gas export. In 2007 Azerbaijan became self-sufficient in terms of both gas and oil, 
as well as a net exporter of natural gas—a new status that goaded international and 
particularly European interests.   
.   
3.2. Diversification of natural gas export 
 
The 2001 contract for Azerbaijani natural gas exports to Turkey and the construction 
of the BTE gas pipeline that ran parallel to the BTC oil pipeline signalled a breakout from 
Azerbaijan’s geographically and infrastructurally enclosed location similar to the one that 
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resulted from the diversification of oil export pipelines. When the Azerbaijani-Turkish gas 
trade agreement was signed, Azerbaijan was running gas pipelines in three directions: to 
Russia, via the Hajigabul-Mozdok pipeline (where the gas import came from), to Iran via the 
Baku-Astara pipeline and to Georgia via the Baku-Akstafa pipeline. The commission of the 
BTE pipeline through Georgia to Turkey in 2006 placed Azerbaijan in the focus of 
international attention more than anything else since the “Contract of the Century.” 
As a consequence of the 2005–2006 gas debate between Russia and the Ukraine, the 
European Union accelerated its plans to lessen its dependence upon Russia for natural gas. 
Because the EU was expected to dynamically increase its natural gas consumption,
71
 
beginning in 2006 European states and multinational companies promoted various pipeline 
projects to the EU that were meant to supply it with Azerbaijani gas resources (from the 
second stage of Shah Deniz) and, optionally, from Central Asian natural resources. All of the 
European pipeline plans, later referred to collectively as the European Southern Gas Corridor, 
were based on the hope that consistent supplies of Azerbaijani and even Central Asian 
natural gas would lower Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas. In Baku, the hope was for 
additional diversification of Azerbaijani export—this time to a non-interfering, reliable, large 
market. These plans, shown in Figure 5, included the Nabucco, promoted by the European 
Commission; the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline,
72
 the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI);
73
 
the White Stream project;
74
 and the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector
75
 (AGRI). 
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5. The European Southern Gas Corridor Plans 
Source: Euractiv 
 
The Azerbaijani-EU energy relationship, especially in terms of the gas trade, were 
expressed in 2006 in a memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan that stated, in part: 
The Azerbaijani energy sector is, and will remain, one of the major factors for the 
economic and social development of Azerbaijan through the exploitation and export 
of natural oil and gas resources, and the potential rapid development of transport and 
of transit of oil and natural gas. The gradual convergence with the EU's internal 
energy market, aiming ultimately at its integration, remains a shared priority for the 
EU and Azerbaijan.
76
  
 
The document also mentions the successful completion of the BTC pipeline and Azerbaijan’s 
potential importance as a transit and supplier of hydrocarbon resources to the EU from the 
Caspian region and Central Asia, especially from the Shah Deniz field.  
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In this context, ensuring a safe, transparent, reliable and secure transit system is of 
great importance for both the EU and Azerbaijan. With a view to enhancing European 
energy security, both sides particularly stress the vital role of the development of all 
means of transportation from the Caspian region, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum 
gas pipeline, and relevant multimodal transportation projects.
77
 
 
 
 The National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2007) also echoes the 
importance of the relations with its neigbors and the European Union as  
Close cooperation of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the European Union will 
contribute to the stability in the Caucasus and will promote the European values in the 
region.  
 
The document also emphasizes the BTC oil and BTE gas pipelines that as a result of the 
cooperation between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia contributed to global and European energy 
security and became a ”factor of stability in the region.”78 
Azerbaijan received the European plans well.
79
 With the establishment of natural gas 
export to Europe, Baku was poised to reach at least three important goals: export 
diversification to the well-paying European market, the cementing of political and economic 
independence and the beginning of regional stability. Azerbaijani leaders became impatient 
with the slow implementation of the European projects, however. In 2009 Baku not only 
criticized
80
 the main European project, the ambitious Nabucco, but also committed itself to 
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alternative markets and emphasized its need for multiple pipelines.
81
 These were not long in 
coming. In 2009 Azerbaijan and Russia agreed on Azerbaijani natural gas export to Russia; in 
January 2011 Azerbaijan and Iran signed a five-year contract for Azerbaijani gas export to 
Iran;
82
 in 2009 and 2010 Azerbaijan signed a couple of agreements on gas trade with Syria 
(and with Turkey, about the infrastructure of this export);
83
 and on 28 January 2011 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine signed an intergovernmental agreement on natural gas trade.
84
  
These negotiations indicate Azerbaijani interest in new markets; however, they may 
also be interpreted as pressure on Azerbaijan’s European partners in light of the absence of an 
Azerbaijani delegation to the signing ceremony for the Nabucco Agreements in Kayseri in 
June 2011. This absence stood in marked contrast to President Aliyev’s attendance at the 
Budapest Nabucco Conference in 2009. 
 
3.3. Natural gas as a foreign policy instrument? 
Azerbaijan’s natural gas export diversification efforts may ultimately require long-
term reliance on multiple pipelines, multiple markets and a variety of consumers. Azerbaijan 
needs gas revenues now, and will need them eve more when its oil output begins to decline.
85
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However, due to the parity between gas and oil expoert strategies, those similarities may be 
interpreted somewhate differently.  
The most important point is that the diversification of oil export was in itself a 
strategic goal that enabled other essential goals to be met: the establishment of oil export 
transit to world markets (especially Europe), without passing through Russia or Iran, backed 
by the West, and the resulting counterbalance with regional powers. A similar process is 
taking place with natural gas. Azerbaijan’s primary diversification need, and goal, is the 
establishment of gas pipelines to Europe. Such pipelines will provide access to a large, 
reliable, high-paying, with stable demand: the European “netback market that has been 
mentioned by various Azerbaijani leaders. 
 One strategic point must still be considered, however: 
Close cooperation of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the European Union will 
contribute to the stability in the Caucasus”86[…] „trilateral strategic partnership and 
deepening cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey has developed into a 
factor of stability in the region. This cooperation, resulting in successful 
implementation of infrastructure projects such as Baku-Supsa, Heydar Aliyev Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan export oil pipelines and South Caucasus gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum), has increased the importance of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, 
contributed to the European and global energy security and laid the foundations for 
the new vital and secure energy source for Europe.
87
  
Thus, the establishment of natural gas export to Europe that creates a direct 
infrastructural connection with this large extra-regional partner is a strategically crucial 
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reason, beyond its commercial value,
88
 for Baku to prioritze the European markets over its 
other ones. Official hints and remarks reveal this need for “big new natural gas markets 
reliably regulated by law, and where there is demand for fuel”89 and that Europe continues to 
be the market of the future for Azerbaijan.
90
 
Azerbaijan’s consideration of Europe as a primary market has also been emphasized 
by the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Southern Gas Corridor signed on 13 
January 2011 by the EU and Azerbaijan. In addition, the 15 agreements signed in Izmir by 
Azerbaijan and Turkey on October 25 2011 resolved the longstanding price disputes between 
Ankara and Baku, established mutually agreeable transit and officially commited 10 billion 
m
3
 of the annually projected maximal 16 billion m
3
 gas output of the second stage of the Shah 
Deniz field for European export and the remaining 6 billion m
3
 for Turkey.
91
 These 
settlements have paved the way for the implementation of at least part of Azerbaijan’s 
ambitious European Southern Gas Corridor plans. 
 Azerbaijan may follow a multi-vectoral or balanced natural gas export policy for its 
growing natural gas output; if so, it will be weighted toward European markets. Compared to 
its current markets (e.g., Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Iran and Syria) and the ones currently 
under negotiation (e.g., Ukraine), Europe is the biggest, best paying, most reliable market 
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with stable demand. The stability of demand in Turkey, Russia and Iran is debatable given 
that Turkey has already “overcontracted” itself, while the latter two countries, despite their 
respective claims of willingness to buy as much gas as Baku can sell, already own the largest 
gas reserves in the world and thus have their own energy policy interests. For these reasons, 
these countries are not only customers but also real or potential market competitors for 
Azerbaijan. Furthermore, both Moscow and Tehran are capable of intervening in Azerbaijan 
and indeed have already done so; Georgia is a small market; both  Syrian output and political 
situation are volatile;
92
 and Ukraine has an infamous record of non-payment despite the large 
demands of its energy-intensive economy.
93
 
Without question, the exploration of Shah Deniz opened up new opportunities for 
Azerbaijan, which became self-sufficient in natural gas as a result. However, the construction 
of the BTE gas pipeline also exposed Azerbaijan’s infrastructural dependence on Russia. The 
further development and diversification of natural gas export to Europe through pipelines will 
both cater to a new a new market and also fulfill Azerbaijan’s strategic goal of attaining 
regional stability. Nonetheless, the slow implementation of European projects has compelled 
Azerbaijan not only to establish other markets such as Russia and Iran but also to explore 
future export options such as Syria and Ukraine. The following chapter examines whether and 
how this overall strategy appears in the Azerbaijani decision making system and what role 
natural gas may have in the Azerbaijani energy industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN AND ENERGY POLICY DECISION MAKING AND THE 
PLACE OF NATURAL GAS IN THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 
 
As has been discussed in chapters 1–3, foreign policy and energy are interconnected in 
Azerbainjan. How these connections are made by decision makers how the strategic interests 
described in the second and third chapters appear in the decision making and what 
commercial interests underly the decisions are the subjects of this chapter. 
Although the formal aspects of these matters can be traced, they do not offer a 
complete picture of the whole decision making system. As S. Frederick Starr (2006) noted, 
informal networks, kinships and power brokers/clans (“Politics B”) makes important behind-
the-scenes decisions about public policy (“Politics A)94 Although Azerbaijan’s authoritarian 
system allows  key decisions to be made by the president, he rules in cooperation with an elite 
based on family networks, business interests and strongmen from the top of the pre-
independence bureaucracy.
95
 This small decision-making elite operates in non-transparent 
way, without real popular participation. This lack of separation between economic and 
political elites, and the dovetailing of their interests, has a major impact on Azerbaijan’s 
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foreign policy.
96
 Energy policis are used not only to maintain Azerbaijan’s international 
positions but also to maintain internal the status quo—with  the help of energy revenues.  
 
4.1.  Azerbaijan’s foreign policy formulation and decision making system 
 
Since independence, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy making has been both largely 
personalized and connected to the person of the president. The Constitutional Act on the State 
Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan (August 30, 1991)
97
 and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (November 12, 1995)
98
 both define a presidential republic in which 
the executive power belongs to the president. The constitution explicitly declares that 
members of the main governmental body, the Cabinet of Ministers established by the 
president, are subordinates of the president and report to him. The constitution also declares 
that the procedures of this cabinet  are defined by the president.
99
 
This impact of the strong presidential power and the authoritarian character of the 
political system is evident in the changes made by Azerbaijani presidents to Azerbaijani 
foreign policy.
100
 Ayaz Mutallibov (1991–92), the last first secretary of the Azerbaijan 
Communist Party and the first president, established a pro-Russia foreign policy line.  
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His successor, the democratically elected Abulfaz Elcibey (1992–93) of the 
Azerbaijani Popular Front, followed a foreign policy line that was pro-Western and pro-
Turkish but anti-Russia and anti-Iran. His policy decisions were largely based on avoiding the 
Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and negotiating with Western 
oil companies over investments in the Azerbaijani energy sector that were meant to bankroll 
the country’s independence. 
 Heydar Aliyev’s (1993-2003) seizure of power in June 1993 after the domestic 
economic and political turmoil and losses sustained in the Karabakh war (1988-94) meant a 
new, pragmatic turn in Azerbaijani foreign policy. Aliyev placated Russia by affixing 
Azerbaijan’s ratification to the CIS and catered to the Russian elite by  bringing Lukoil into 
resumed negotiations with foreign investors. The “Contract of the Century,” which directly 
influenced Azerbaijan’s energy revenue hike and Aliyev’s multi-vectoral foreign policy, 
helped stabilize Azerbaijan’s regional and internal positions and independence. Thus far, the 
President Ilham Aliyev (2003–) has followed both his father’s multi-vectoral foreign policy 
line and his utilization of growing energy revenues in domestic as well as foreign policy.   
 
4.2.  Azerbaijan’s energy policy decision making 
The process of Azerbaijani energy policy decision making is as centralized as the 
process of crafting foreign policy. The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic 
(SOCAR), formed by the merger of Soviet companies Azerneft and Azneftkimiya in 
September 1992, is the key player in the Azerbaijani energy industry. Despite the 
establishment in 2004 of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, which was supposed to 
supervise the company, the president and the PSAs have granted it largely symbolic duties. 
SOCAR, one of Azerbaijan’s biggest taxpayers, operates much of the onshore production 
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facilities and all of the oil and gas production assets inherited from the Soviet era. Beyond 
production, the company is involved in petroleum policy and regulation, and plays a central 
role in negotiations with international investors. 
SOCAR is also an important player in policy formulation.
101
 Personal connections and 
loyalty are required from the company’s top leadership; as a result, of its presidents have been 
close associates of the respective presidents of Azerbaijan. Particularly since Ilham Aliyev’s 
rise to power (not independently of his experience at SOCAR, where he was vice-president 
from 1994 to 2004) the president has become even more active in SOCAR’s management 
because the state energy company is intended to deliver for political as well as economic 
benefits.
102
 SOCAR’s status as a “state within the state” that is not only used by the ruling 
elite for its own aims but is also considered to be a hotbed of nepotism and corruption.
103
  
SOCAR, the only entity authorized to negotiate PSAs with international companies, 
has brought about more than two dozen PSAs in the last 18 years that are all largely similar to 
each other. After agreement has ben reached between SOCAR and a contractor, each PSA is 
ratified by the Milli Majlis (parliament) and functionally
104
 becomes a law, signed by the 
president. Project management is handled by official Management Committees that are 
                                                             
101
 Kjaernet H (2010) The State Oil Company SOCAR: A microcosm of Azerbaijani development? Caucasus 
Analytical Digest 16: 5–8.  
102
 Lussac S (2011) The State as a (Oil)Company? The Political Economy of Azerbaijan, GARNET Working 
Paper. pp 22-25. Source: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/7410.pdf. Retrived: 
DATE. 
103 Gojayev V (2010) Resource Nationalism Trends in Azerbaijan, RUSSCASP Working paper, 2010 March. p14. 
104
 Bati A (2003) The Legal Status of Production Sharing Agreements in Azerbaijan, Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law, 21: 153–167. 
46 
 
 
formed by the contractors and SOCAR and chaired by SOCAR delegates.
105
 This 
arrangement ensures close surveillance of every operation by the Azerbaijani side. 
SOCAR also plays a key role in Azerbaijan’s energy export transit system. As Samuel 
Lussac (YEAR) described, Azerbaijani oil and gas export transit systems are dominated by 
SOCAR, the operator company of each system and BP (the largest stakeholder in both the 
AIOC consortium and the Shah Deniz PSA). The interests and interrelations among firms 
controlled by the Azerbaijani presidency and various elite groups (e.g., Azersun), joint 
ventures, and, finally, companies and projects owned by Western entities collectively control 
Azerbaijan’s transit network. Since the mid-2000s, however, through SOCAR the presidency 
has been attempting to exert more control over non-Western-owned parts of the transportation 
network. 
In short, given the BP’s central role in the operations of ACG oil, Shah Deniz gas 
fields and both the BTC and BTE pipelines, along with SOCAR’s position as the most 
authoritative respresentative of the Azerbaijani state in all oil- and gas-related negotiations, 
no decisions can be made without the Azerbaijani government and BP.
106
 Certainly, given the 
importance of transit infrastructure in the natural gas trade, these relations also have 
important implications for foreign policy. Although Azerbaijan has not started down the road 
of resource nationalism, as Kazakhstan or Russia have done, because oil has become the key 
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diplomatic tool for Azerbaijani leadership; moreover, Baku cannot do without Western 
investment and state of-the-art technology.
107
 
The distribution of energy revenues is also a crucial part of the energy policy decision 
making system. The first major recipients of oil revenues in Azerbaijan were the state budget 
and SOCAR. However, given Azerbaijan’s limited oil resources (which will decline after the 
expected peak in the first half of the 2010s), the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) was created in 1999 
upon international advice in order to accumulate the revenues of PSA projects and preserve 
them for future generations. SOFAZ is controlled by the president and its resources are 
allocated by presidential decree. As a result of the overwhelming importance of production of 
fields under PSAs (especially the ACG), SOFAZ is the key recipient of energy revenues, 
large parts of which are transferrred directly into the state budget. Nonetheless, due to the 
overcentralized, authoritarian Azerbaijani political system, imperfect laws and the dominant 
role of the executive branch, inefficient management of energy revenues has raised some 
major concerns.
108
  
 
4.3. The role of natural gas export in Azerbaijan's policy making 
Azerbaijani energy policy now has an asset of growing importance: the natural gas 
industry, particularly through the prospects of increasing natural gas exports. Natural gas has 
been produced in Azerbaijan since the 1930s. However, both the Azerbaijani energy industry 
and the production of its natural gas fields began to decline in the 1980s, after the discovery 
of the Western Siberian natural gas fields and the Soviet Union’s subsequent neglect of 
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Azerbaijan’s energy potential (to the point that Baku was compelled to import gas from the 
Russian and Turkmen SSR). Despite this situation, natural gas also emerged in the 1980s as 
the most important source of Azerbaijani primary power supply (see Figure 6).
109
 
Azerbaijan’s energy industry began to revive on 20 September 1994 with the signing 
of the “Contract of the Century,” its first PSA, that involved 11 foreign oil companies. 
However, despite SOCAR’s no-cost acquisition of associated gas from the ACG fields, that 
gas has not been sufficient for both domestic consumption and oil production. This situation 
changed in 1999 when the PSA led by BP and Statoil found a new, relatively large
110
 offshore 
natural gas field, Shah Deniz. This field contains enough resources not only to cover domestic 
needs but also to provide substantial volumes of gas for export. In 2006 its first stage was put 
under operation at the same time as the BTC oil and BTE gas pipelines were commissioned. 
The Shah Deniz field has enabled Baku both to suspend Russian import, which was becoming 
more and more expensive, to end Azerbaijan’s dependence on Russian sources and, in 2007, 
to become a net exporter of natural gas.  
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6. Azerbaijan – energy mix 1990-2010 
Sources of Data: Bowden, Julian [2009]: p 207. Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
Although more than 70 percent (by far the largest share) of Azerbaijan’s natural gas 
production now comes from Shah Deniz
111
 and will continue to do so until 2020, substantial 
reserves remain that can be put under production after 2020. For example, in late 2010 the 
first SOCAR-led gas discovery project found and began to develop the Umid, an offshore 
natural gas. In September 2011, Total discovered a major offshore gas field, Absheron,
112
 that 
is expected to boost Azerbaijan’s gas export capacity in the 2020s. Azerbaijan may have an 
export potential of 35 billion m
3
 annually by 2035.
113
 With these assets, it is no surprise that 
Azerbaijan has begun to present itself as a significant future gas exporter.
114
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Despite its substantial growth, however, natural gas export has not yet contributed a 
significant share to Azerbaijan’s energy-dominated export revenues (see Figure 7). According 
to data in the Azerbaijani Statistical Yearbook, in 2009 natural gas export revenues were 
about 1 percent (125 million USD) of Azerbaijani export revenues (oil revenues accounted 
for 92 percent (13.5 billion USD). However, Azerbaijan has been exporting gas to Turkey, 
Georgia and Russia and in 2011 signed a five-year gas export contract with Iran. Of these 
partners, only Russia pays prices that compare to the European netback prices. Turkey (based 
on a 2001 contract) and Georgia (a key transit state) have been paying largely subsidized 
prices, while Iran, having promised to pay “European” prices, has not yet purchased gas from 
Azerbaijan at all. 
When gas exports to Europe are established, substantially larger gas revenues are 
expected. Although gas prices when the first (expected) flow of gas to Europe begins in 2017 
cannot now be estimated, Azerbaijan is expected to realize higher revenues by at least one 
order of magnitude. Dobronravin (2008) mentioned 1 billion USD per annum
115
 and Peters 
(2011) has estimated roughly 3 billion USD of annual income for Baku if 10 billion m
3
 of gas 
can be exported yearly to Europe.
116
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7. Azerbaijan’s export revenues in 2009 by product category 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan 2010
117
 
 
Beyond their inherent foreign policy implications, energy resources—especially oil––
also have commercial benefits. As we have seen, energy revenues have been considered a key 
factor in the stabilization of Azerbaijan’s political order and economy by the ruling political 
elite.
118
 However, concentrating these financial benefits within the elite has had the side effect 
creating wider social gaps, and this situation is poised to become a major destabilizing factor 
in the future.
119
 Not only are oil production and revenues both expected to peak in the first 
half of this decade, Azerbaijan’s economy is still overwhelmingly dependent on energy 
revenues. Despite the creation of SOFAZ to manage and preserve oil revenues for future 
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generations, spending has not been measured in terms of efficiency
120
 and SOFAZ funds are 
largely used to cover the current expenses of the state administration.
121
 
 
8. Dynamics of oil production in Azerbaijan 
Source: Vugar Gojayev [2010] cites data by Ingilab Ahmedov, Public Finance Monitoring Centre 
 
From figure 8 it is obvious that the Azerbaijani political elite will need additional if 
maintaining the country’s internal stability. We may therefore assume that future natural gas 
income will be used to offset future declines in oil revenue. To what extent natural gas 
revenues will affect Azerbaijan’s energy revenue cannot be known, particularly because 
prices cannot be predicted; however, it is speculated that gas revenues equalled 20% of the 
2009 oil revenues. What is known is that the shale gas “revolution” and the LNG trade are 
                                                             
120
 Center for Economic and Social Development (2007) Strategy for State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan Republic. 
Baku: Center for Economic and Social Development, 13. 
 
121
 Four main areas of state spending have grown due to the oil windfall: management (including wages and 
pensions), state investment, social needs and the army. Bagirov S (2007) Oil of Azerbaijan: Revenues, Expenses 
and Risks (View from 2007). Budapest: Central European University, 11–12. 
53 
 
 
transforming regional markets into a more interconnected system and gas supply is growing 
in Europe. Nonetheless, the long-term impact of shale gas on prices cannot be estimated.
122
   
As we have seen, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and energy policy (especially energy 
export) are strongly interrelated; in addition, foreign policy and energy policy decisions are 
made by the a largely unchanging cast of political actors (first and foremost, the president) 
and (regarding extraction and operation) investors such as BP. Natural resources, especially 
oil, have not only been used for foreign policy goals but have also been also tools for the elite 
to use in the stabilization of the country’s internal political order and economy. Moreover, the 
potential of natural gas as a strategic asset has grown since 2007 when it became evident that 
Azerbaijan may become a net exporter. These prospects of growing production and export 
provide new opportunities for Baku to further stabilize its positions along the pipelines. 
Future natural gas revenues may also allow the elite preserve geopolitical and economic 
stability in the era of declining oil revenues in the largely energy revenue-dependent 
Azerbaijan.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AZERBAIJANI NATURAL GAS EXPORT 
 
From its earliest days, the establishment of Azerbaijani natural gas export has had 
international political implications. Azerbaijan’s first post-1991 gas export pipeline, the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) was built in order to transit the output of the first phase of the 
Shah Deniz field to Turkey through Georgia. As a landlocked country, Azerbaijan must 
consider transit and relations with transit countries as crucial factors in its natural gas export 
strategies. As it was in Azerbaijan’s oil export plans, George has been the most important 
transit country for gas export to Azerbaijan’s first market, Turkey, and is the preferred 
direction of gas export to Europe. This South Caucasus country to the east is likely to remain 
the preferred route for gas export, particularly because the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
prevents gas transit to the west, through Armenia.  
 Slow implementation of its European plans and its own growing gas output, have 
caused Azerbaijan to begin exporting gas to partners other than Turkey and Georgia.  
 
5.1.  Georgia: a transit country of key importance and a small market 
The obvious relevance and challenges of transit issues are obvious can be clearly seen 
in the Azerbaijani foreign policy decision to make Georgia its key transit state. Not only do 
the two countries share common security concerns as former Russian states, Azerbaijan has 
demonstrated its Georgian energy strategy with subsidized prices and asset acquisition 
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similarly to the ways that Russia has utilized its energy resources as leverage in its foreign 
policies regarding other post-Soviet countries.
123
 
For Azerbaijan, the basic options for oil and gas transit to western markets have been 
Russia, Georgia (and Turkey) and Iran. Of course, the choice of the Georgian route was also 
made for political reasons, as shown by the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines through Georgia 
instead through Russia or Iran.  
Georgia’s attitudes are of critical importance to the successful implementation of 
western natural gas export from the landlocked Azerbaijan. Fortunately, Georgia’s stances 
have been quite positive. In the 1990s, for example, Tbilisi was determined to strengthen its 
independence from Russia by participating in pipeline projects aimed at carrying Azerbaijani 
oil (and later, natural gas) to world and regional markets, respectively.
124
 The desire to break 
free from its dependence on oil and natural gas imports from Russia was also a strong 
incentive for Tbilisi to diversify its hydrocarbon imports with Azerbaijani resources; a desire 
that grew after further deterioration of relations with Moscow culminated in the Russo-
Georgian conflict of 2008. Another important factor for Georgia is that Azerbaijan sells its 
gas for lower prices than Russia does. Moreover, Tbilisi receives natural gas as a transit fee in 
exchange for being the key transit country forAzerbaijani hydrocarbon resources.
125
 In 2008, 
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for the five-year fixed price of $120/1000 m
3
 gas Azerbaijan (using energy as a policy tool as 
Moscow has done) stabilized its positions and leverage in Georgia and, through SOCAR, 
effectively took over significant parts of the Georgian gas distribution network.
126
 This move, 
added to its other investments and acquisitions in the Georgian energy sector since 2006, has 
made the Azerbaijani state-owned oil company the country’s biggest taxpayer.127 
Aside from its strategic importance in the secure flow of oil and gas through the Baku-
Tbilisi-Supsa, BTC oil and BTE gas pipelines, Georgia is also central to Azerbaijan’s plans to 
export gas to Europe and Ukraine in the future. In order to implement the onshore phase of 
the AGRI project as well as the Azerbaijani-Ukrainian LNG trade, an LNG compressing 
terminal and a pipeline of sufficient capacity will have to be built from Azerbaijan to the 
Georgian seashore alongside the present oil and natural gas pipelines. 
 
5.2. Turkey: The strategic ally, first contracted market and future transit state 
Not only has Turkey participated in the diversification of Azerbaijani oil export (BTC) 
and became Azerbaijan’s first natural gas market, Ankara’s energy hub strategy is to make 
Turkey  the key transit state of Caspian natural gas resources to Europe. 
Not long after the discovery of Shah Deniz, in 2001 Turkish state-owned crude oil and 
natural gas pipelines and trading company Botas contracted 6.6 billion m
3
/year of Azerbaijani 
natural gas.
128
 The subsequent construction of the BTE gas pipeline supplied the energy-
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hungry Turkish economy. Turkey also considers Azerbaijan’s European gas import 
diversification plans to be a great opportunity. Because pipelines from the Caspian to Europe 
are slated to pass through Turkey, Ankara has decided to consider the country a regional 
energy hub. Although the natural gas demands of the Turkish economy have been rising since 
the late 1990s, due to too-optimistic economic growth predictions Turkey has overcontracted 
itself for natural gas (Figure 9).   
 
9. Botas natural gas sale and purchase agreements 
Source: http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp?id=6 
 
Turkey has had three major goals: 1) to make use of its location as leverage for 
speeding up its access to the European Union;
 129
 2) in light of its over-contracting, to keep 
the purchase price of Azerbaijani (and expensive Russian
130
) gas low and possibly re-export it 
to Europe; and 3) given the fact that all the Azerbaijani (and if implemented, Central Asian) 
                                                             
129
 Tekin A and Williams PA (2011) Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 145–149. 
130
 Considering Russian gas too expensive, Turkey canceled its contract to export gas via a western pipeline 
from Russia. Hurriyet (2 October 2011) Turkey cancels gas deal with Russia, consumer prices hike. Source: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-cancels-gas-deal-with-russia-consumer-
prices-hike-2011-10-02. Retrieved: 22 October 2011.  
 
58 
 
 
gas would flow through its territory, trying to obtain more of it at bargain prices for its rising 
economy that remains, in spite of being over-contracted, heavily dependent on Russian gas.
131
 
Since 2008 these Turkish aims have fueled price and transit disputes with Azerbaijan 
(intensified in 2008–9 during the brief Turkish-Armenian rapprochement) over future 
Azerbaijani gas flows to Europe
132
 Furthermore, because of Ankara’s staunch positions in the 
gas transit debate with Baku, its otherwise fraternal ally, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania 
suggested the AGRI LNG project, which would exclude Turkey from the Azerbaijani-
European transit nexus.
133
 
The disputes between Baku and Ankara have not hindered other формс оф 
cooperation between them, however. One example is the possible strenghtening of Ankara’s 
energy-hub ambitions that would occur if Azerbaijani gas exports to Syria begin via the 
Turkish pipeline grid.
134
 Partly on the strength of the two countries’ mutual interests in 
European gas import diversification (supply from Azerbaijan, transit through Turkey) the 
Azerbaijani-Turkish gas price and transit disputes were resolved on 25 October 2011 when 15 
agreements between Azerbaijan and Turkey were signed in Izmir. The agreements settled the 
long price disputes between Ankara and Baku and set forth agreed-upon terms for Azerbaijani 
gas transit to Europe. The agreements also officially committed l 6 billion m
3 
of gas annually 
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from the second phase of Shah Deniz for Turkey,
135
 an allocation that paved the way for the 
implementation of at least part of the ambitious European Southern Gas Corridor plans. 
 
5.3. Russia: the key regional power, new export market and market competitor 
Russia, by far Azerbaijan’s largest and most powerful neighbor, has set the benchmark 
for Azerbaijani foreign policy since Azerbaijan became effectively independent, in spite of 
Russia’s attempts to maintain a lock on its influence the Southern Caucasus, its practical 
support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and its intervention into Azerbaijani 
internal issues during the political turmoil of 1992–93. Russia’s influenced has only been 
strengthened by the fact that it was the key source of Azerbaijani natural gas import between 
1985 and 1995 and from 2000 until 2007. Even now, Russian-Azerbaijani relations are still 
based on two major dimensions: energy issues and Nagorno-Karabakh.
136
 
During President Elcibey’s pro-Western and pro-Turkish foreign policy line and 
during the Aliyevs’ multi-vectoral foreign policy, Azerbaijan was particularly anxious to 
maintain its independence from Moscow. Spurred by Gazprom’s price hike in early 2007 and 
encouraged by the discovery and utilization of the Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan has 
suspended gas imports from Russia,
137
 a move that effectively severed the Azerbaijani energy 
industry from Moscow’s leverage. 
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Without question, Russia’s energy strategy has been based in the context of political, 
economic and market considerations
138
 in which energy is a tool for strategic manipulation.
139
 
This has been especially true during Putin’s term, when geopolitical and geo-economical 
considerations have come to the fore. But it has also manifested in the Russian efforts to 
control Eurasian oil and gas supplies throughout Eurasia. Russia, with its slowly declining gas 
output and amortizing transit infrastructure, has been eager to acquire Central Asian gas more 
cheaply in order to cover Europe’s growing needs—and to reap European netback prices—by 
re-exporting it and thereby postponing pricey investments into the development new fields on 
the Yamal peninsula and the associated transit infrastructure. Russia has also tried to derail 
U.S.-backed European energy diversification plans because Moscow perceives them as 
unfriendly moves that threaten Russian control over Eurasian energy supply networks 
Considering these tensions and aspirations, it is no wonder that in spite of Russia’s 
own commercial incentive to supply some North Caucasus territories, which can be done 
more cheaply from Azerbaijan than from Siberia, barely in mid-2008 (barely 18 months afer 
the suspension of Azerbaijani gas imports from Russia) Russian gas giant Gazprom offered to 
import Azerbaijani natural gas at “European prices”—a move that would, of course, have 
decreased the amount of gas available for Azerbaijan’s European projects. Having seen the 
slow implementation of Nabucco and other European projects, in order to retain a market for 
its own growing production Azerbaijan signed an export contract with Russia in 2009 that 
increased the amount of exported gas to 3 billion m
3
 in 2012 and “more than 3 billion” m3 
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after 2013.
140
 But Baku also had political reasons to opt for gas export to Russia and to not 
alienate Moscow: the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s close 
relationship with Armenia and Russia’s possible role in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.
141
 
However, Azerbaijan cannot substitute Russia for a large, reliable, politically non-
interfering market like Europe, even though Russia pays “European prices” for Azerbaijani 
gas. For one thing, Baku cannot be sure that Russia will remain a stable, well-paying market 
and a reliable transit route. Despite its declining output, Russia has the largest gas reserves in 
the world and it is obvious that Moscow buys Azerbaijani gas in large part to undermine its 
European ambitions. 
Transit of Azerbaijani gas through Russia to Europe would be problematic for two 
other reasons as well. First, beyond Russian’s attempts to maintain its leverage in the South 
Caucasus, its Eurasian energy strategy and Moscow’s record in utilizing its transit positions 
against Central Asian producers force Baku to stay aware of the dangers of dependence on 
Russian transit. For these reasons, dependence on Russian transit is essentially against 
Azerbaijan’s strategy of multiple export, pipeline-based, multi-vectoral foreign policy. 
Second, the transit cost of gas trade through Russia would be too high for European buyers. 
Baku would certainly not turn a profit, nor does it want to swallow that cost.
142
 Essentially, 
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Russian opposition to European gas import diversification efforts in the Caspian has made 
Baku and Moscow into competitors for the European market.   
 
5.4. Iran: the controversial neighbor and new export market 
Iran’s strained relationship with Azerbaijan since it became independent from Russia 
extends the two countries’ relations in the natural gas trade. Tehran, suspicious of 
Azerbaijan’s independence and Baku’s stance towards the Azeri minority in Iran in the early 
1990s, has maintained a good relationship with Armenia. Iran has also been opposed to 
Azerbaijani offshore explorations in the Caspian Sea, citing its unresolved status and 
sometimes resorting to military threat to emphasize this message.
143
 For its part, Azerbaijani 
leadership has been suspicious of Iran’s relations with religious groups in Azerbaijan. Baku 
has good reason to maintain positive relations with Tehran, however:  since 2006 the 
Nakhichevan exclave has been supplied by Azerbaijani natural gas through Iranian territory. 
Nonetheless, Iran is deeply interested in Azerbaijani natural gas resources. Despite 
sitting on the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, Iran’s growing production can 
hardly keep up with its large consumption. Lacking foreign investment, Iran’s domestic 
investment in its gas pipeline infrastructure is insufficient because of its high subsidization of 
its enormous domestic consumption and because the infrastructure based on domestic 
resources doesn’t cover all parts of the country.144 Therefore, Iran has been eager to buy more 
Azerbaijani gas for “European prices” to meet its domestic needs. In January 2011 Iran and 
Azerbaijan contracted for an annual export of yearly 1 billion m
3
 of natural gas for five 
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years.
145
 Although Iran has not yet purchased natural gas from Azerbaijan, the contract is 
viable and Azerbaijan has offered to supply gas for Iran
146
 despite the tense relationship 
between the two countries.  
Beyond some common strategic and commercial interests, Iran could not be a long-
term, big market for Azerbaijan energy export even if it did not have its own huge reserves 
and energy export ambitions. Not only are Azerbaijan and Iran potential competitors, the 
implementation of Azerbaijan’s European import diversification plans in the Caspian is 
intended to involve Azerbaijani sources—not Iranian ones.    
 
5.5. The European Union: the most desirable future market  
The European Union and Azerbaijan have mutual interests in the import of Caspian 
energy resources from the post-Soviet Caspian region. Countries of the European Union, 
most of which are lacking sufficient energy sources, have substantial demands for oil and 
natural gas. Due to the production decline of indigenous sources (especially in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands), the EU is expected to become more and more reliant on 
import. Although the EU has formulated the intention of establishing a cleaner and more 
energy- efficient economy,
147
 its dependence on hydrocarbons remains high, especially 
because of some countries’s mistrust of nuclear energy (see Figure 10).  
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10. Gross inland energy consumption in the EU 27, 1999-2009 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Russia has been a key supplier of both oil and natural gas, especially to East and 
Central Europe (see Figure 11). However, since the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 between 
Russia and Ukraine concern has risen within the EU about energy security and especially 
about Russia’s role as a reliable supplier. 148  Although the EU has been in favor of the 
diversification of natural gas imports since the gas crisis, the issue of efficient European plans 
for the diversification of energy, especially natural gas imports, has been curtailed by the lack 
of a blanket energy policy and the diversity of the member states’ energy industries, energy 
sources and interests. The U.S. has also backed European natural gas import diversification 
plans because they dovetail with Washington’s strategy of strengthening the energy security 
of Europe and helping the Caspian post-Soviet producers reach world markets.
149
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112. European dependence on imports of Russian natural gas in 2007 
Source: http://www.dpa.de/Infographics-Slideshow.482.0.html 
 
Even though the EU and Azerbaijan have a much broader common agenda and better 
mutual relations, as shown by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (part of  the 
framework of the European Neighborhood Policy signed between Baku and Brussels in 1999), 
since 2006 energy has been the most salient Euroepan interest in Azerbaijan. Since the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006, Brussels has sought closer relations with the post-
Soviet Caspian region and better cooperation over energy trade. The Memorandum of 
Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan in the Field of Energy (MoU), signed by the EU and Azerbaijan in 2006, 
implicitly reflects European fears that began with the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis and the 
launch of gas production from the Shah Deniz field. The MoU addresses several mutual 
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security interests in the Southern Caucasus as well, especially regarding the security that an 
energy trade infrastructure may provide and may need.
150
 
 
32. European plans for the diversification of natural gas import, 2011 
Source: Euractiv 
Since the early 2000s various pipeline plans by European energy companies have 
appeared to utilize Shah Deniz and Central Asian gas for Europe’s growing consumption; 
since 2006 especially, Azerbaijan has been considered the keystone of European energy 
import diversification efforts (i.e., the European Southern Gas Corridor). The corridor 
includes almost all of the pipeline projects (Figure 12) that would connect the Caspian region 
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with Europe, from the EU-backed Nabucco natural gas pipeline project to the other European 
projects that would diversify natural gas import, namely the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-
Italy pipeline (ITGI), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the White Stream project and the 
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI).  
Despite the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of  2009 and backing by the United States, 
these European plans (including the Nabucco, which has been heavily promoted by the 
European Commission) have not developed very much. The annual 31 billion m
3
 capacity of 
the Nabucco has taken into account the need to transmit Central Asian resources through a 
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The Central Asian supply, however, has been uncertain because 
of the Caspian Sea boundary debates and the bad investment climate in Turkmenistan. The 
world financial crisis has also raised construction costs. Without Central Asian resources, 
only one-third of the Nabucco could be filled with the 10 billion m
3
 gas Azerbaijan has 
offered, a lack that would the project unprofitable for investors despite political backing from 
both Brussels and Washington.  
However, Baku continues to make the European market a clear priority, as shown by 
the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Southern Gas Corridor, signed on 13 
January 2011 between the EU and Azerbaijan, and the 15 agreements signed between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey on 25 October 2011 in Izmir that resolved the price dispute and transit 
debate between Baku and Ankara and opened the way for smaller-scale pipelines such as the 
ITGI and TAP. Moreover, on 26 December 2011 Azerbaijan and Turkey agreed on the 
construction of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which would provide sufficient capacity for 
Azerbaijani natural gas transit through Turkey to Europe––a strong implication that 
Azerbaijan is ready to invest substantial monies in order to connect its current gas export 
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pipeline grid with European ones.
151
 On 20 February 20 the Shah Deniz Consortium (a group 
comprised of the most influential players in SOCAR and BP) opted for the TAP to carry 
natural gas from Shah Deniz to Europe.  
Neither the TAP nor the Nabucco would mean significant diversification of natural 
gas imports for the European Union. However, the implementation of energy import from 
Azerbaijan would be an important step toward the establishment of broader gas import from 
the Caspian to cover Europe’s growing import needs. Nor have decision makers and investors 
seem to have completely abandoned the idea of larger volumes of Azerbaijani or Caspian gas 
flows through a larger-scale pipeline. For example, the South-East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) 
project proposed by the BP, the reconfiguration of Nabucco into “West-Nabucco” and the 
Turkish-Azerbaijani Trans-Anatolian pipeline all promise larger capacities of gas flows from 
the Caspian to the European Union. Despite its current, relatively small volume, Azerbaijani 
gas may strengthen the energy security in some regions. This would be so particularly in 
Central Europe where, harsher winters
152
  may quickly deplete the resources from Russia 
upon which they now depend.  
For Azerbaijan, growing European dependence means secure demand. The importance 
of a stable, well-paying partner like the EU also is indicated by the efforts of Caspian 
countries to establish trade relations with the EU that do not include Russian transit, in spite 
of Moscow’s attempts to use its current pipeline monopoly to keep prices low and maintain 
its regional influence. Thanks to its location west of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is the first 
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non-Russian post-Soviet gas exporter country to have even the opportunity of direct export 
pipeline connections with Europe. As previously mentioned, the EU is also considered to be a 
non-interfering partner politically. This largely neutral stance is also a distinct advantage 
compared to Azerbaijan’s current export markets (except Georgia), which to different degrees 
used their leverage to influence Azerbaijani policy-making in the 1990s. 
In addition, the establishment of European pipelines would make future conflicts in 
the Southern Caucausu such as an escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan more difficult, raising the risks of challenging the status quo. Given the 
strategic nature
153
 of natural gas pipelines that connect producers, transit states and markets, 
the fact that such pipelines require preliminary investment and the fact that it is in 
participants’ best interest to maintain them, those looking to start or continue a war would 
naturally be more cautious about attacking infrastructures. Such attacks would not only 
damage the strategic interests of the aggressors but would also harm the markets. A possible 
shutdown of European gas pipelines due to armed conflict would “bring” the European Union 
directly into the region.
154
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5.6. Azerbaijan’s alternative future market options: Syria, Ukraine 
Despite the difficulties around the implementation of the European gas pipelines, 
Baku has maintained a multi-vectoral approach to its natural gas export policy—albeit with 
particular emphasis on the European vector. This emphasis also means, however, that 
Azerbaijan is open at least in theory to every option of export diversification as its 
negotiations with various non-European markets show. These negotiations have taken place 
for two reasons. First, taking other projects into consideration allows them to raising the 
stakes for partners wishing to participate in extant projects. Second, because gas (unlike oil) 
cannot be stored, Azerbaijan must sell its natural gas surplus but cannot take the 
implementation of some current projects for granted.  
Since 2009 two major Azerbaijani possible alternative gas export negotiations have 
been seriously considered but have led to different levels of implementation: Syria
155
 and 
Ukraine.
156
 Both countries have been looking for natural gas to provide stabile energy sources 
for their economies and both have turned to Azerbaijan as a possible source.  
The Azerbaijani export of natural gas to Syria, the first alternative non-European 
project to considered, also seems as if it will be the first to be implemented. Due to its volatile 
and limited levels of domestic production (see Figure 13), Syria has been importing natural 
gas from Egypt since the completion of the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP)
157
 in 2009 and has been 
looking at additional sources of import to bridge the gap between its domestic consumption 
and its own production. Moreover, Syria’s plans to transform itself into a regional energy hub 
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(the “Four Seas Strategy”) has led to its participation in an energy network that is meant to 
link the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean Sea, Caspian Sea and Black Sea.
158
 Cooperation among 
the Azerbaijani, Turkish and Syrian governments on the establishment of Azerbaijani export 
through Turkey to Syria began in 2009.  
 
43. Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Syria 1985-2010 
Source of Data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy Historical Data. 
 
The first agreement between Azerbaijan and Syria, for the export of 1 billion m
3
/year 
of Azerbaijani natural gas, was signed in July 2009 during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s 
visit to Baku.
159
 Also in 2009, Syria and Turkey agreed to connect the Syrian and Turkish 
natural gas pipeline grids with a pipeline between Aleppo and Kilis by continuing the 
construction of the Arab Gas Pipeline to Turkey,. Although the pipeline was planned to 
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forward Egyptian natural gas to Turkey,
160
 it be used to carry Azerbaijani natural gas to Syria 
through the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline and the Turkish gas pipeline 
network.
161
 The construction of the Syrian portion of the Aleppo-Kilis pipeline has begun and 
is expected to be finished in 2012; the entire pipeline is expected to be completed in 2012.
162
   
Concerning Azerbaijani gas export to Ukraine, large demand can be taken for granted 
(see Figure 14). Since Soviet times the Ukrainian energy industry has been based on 
Ukrainian natural gas production that was large but has since declined. Paradoxically, 
Ukrainian industrial development became more natural-gas-intensive as reserves were 
depleted, making Ukraine heavily and increasingly dependent on Russian natural gas 
import.
163
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54. Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Ukraine 1985-2010 
Source of Data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy Historical Data. 
Since the two natural gas crises with Russia in 2006 and 2009, Ukraine has been 
considering the import of natural gas from the Caspian region, a plan that would both allow it 
to exclude Russian transport networks and ease Kiev’s dependence on Russian natural gas. 
The first plan to carry natural gas from Azerbaijan to Ukraine, the White Stream pipeline 
project,
164
 is still in the blueprint stage. The first step to Ukrainian gas import diversification 
that was both concrete and official took placde when the Intergovernmental Memorandum 
between Ukraine and Azerbaijan was signed on 8 January 2011 for delivery of an annual 
supply of Azerbaijani liquefied natural gas (LNG) beginning in 2015. Project costs for the 
construction of an LNG terminal with the annual capacity of 10 billion m
3
 on the Ukrainian 
Black Sea coast are estimated at 2.5 billion USD.
165
  
Various statements have been made about the possible volume of Ukrainian natural 
gas import from Azerbaijan. The most recent one implies that Ukraine is looking to receive 2 
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billion m
3 
of natural gas annually after 2014 and 5 billion m
3
 after 2015.
166
  In order to 
implement the onshore phase of the Azerbaijani-Ukrainian LNG trade, an LNG compressing 
terminal and a pipeline of sufficient capacity will have to be built from Azerbaijan to the 
Georgian seashore, roughly parallel to the oil and natural gas pipelines that are already there. 
The Syrian and Ukrainian market options pose risks for Azerbaijan. Although the 
Syrian and Turkish pipeline grids have been successfully connected in anticipation of the 
Azerbaijani-Syrian gas trade, Syria is not only continuing to experience internal turbulence 
that began with the Arab Spring and may reduce infrastructure security, due to its volatile gas 
extraction and small market size it cannot be considered as a market with stable demand. 
Despite its large demand, Ukraine has been in a near-constant state of economic cris since 
declaring its independence; in fact, a major reason for Kiev’s sometimes-tense relations with 
Moscow is Ukraine’s inability to pay “European” prices for Russian natural gas.   
   
5.7.  Azerbaijan as a possible transit country 
In order to evaluate the importance of natural gas export within Azerbaijan’s foreign 
policy, the issue of Azerbaijan as a transit country must be addressed. European plans to 
import natural gas from the Caspian are not only based upon Azerbaijani supply but also 
count on Azerbaijan as a transit country for Central Asian (especially Turkmen) natural gas to 
the West. Azerbaijan’s position as a key transit country for future Western-Central Asian 
energy trade has been considered a strategic asset by not only Azerbaijani leaders but also by 
academics such as Zbigniew Brzezinski.     
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 Brzezinski (2009) cited Azerbaijan as a pivotal country in his book The Grand 
Chessboard,
167
 but Azerbaijani leaders were already keen to utilize the country’s location. 
Bordered by three regional powers (Russia to the north, Iran to the south and Turkey to the 
west), Azerbaijan is the only country that can provide transport routes for Central Asian 
natural gas to the West without passing through Russia or Iran. Therefore, U.S.-backed plans 
for pipelines to carry natural gas from Central Asia (especially from Turkmenistan) were 
considered the most valuable by Azerbaijani leadership in the 1990s and the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline (TCP), together with the BTC oil pipeline, was thought of as a branch of the 
“Eurasian Energy Corridor.”168 
 However, Azerbaijan’s stance as a prospective transit country changed with the 
discovery of the Shah Deniz gas field in 1999. Since that time Baku has promoted itself not 
only as a transit state but also as a supplier and, moreover, has demanded that almost half its 
share of the gas from Shah Deniz be exported in the 30 billion m
3
 annual capacity pipeline. 
This demand has brought the TCP to a standstill and has worsenend the traditionally poor 
Azerbaijani-Turkmen relationship.
169
 Although the TCP pipeline plans went were briefly 
revived after the the Nabucco project began in 2002, one of the most serious barriers to the 
implementation of Nabucco has been poor Turkmen-Azerbaijani relations  and especially 
disputes over the borders of the Caspian Sea.  
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 One of the most heated issues in the debate about the status of the Caspian Sea has 
been the borders and ownership of the Azeri, Chirag and Kyapaz (in Turkmen: Omar, Osman 
and Serdar) oil fields that lie between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Since Azerbaijani 
production of the Azeri and Chirag fields began in the mid-1990s Azerbaijani-Turkmen 
relations have cooled and the affiliation of the area has been hotly debated. Although relations 
between Baku and Ashgabat have generally improved since 2007, tensions about the border 
issue have persisted.
170
 The European Union’s promotion of negotiations in order to reach an 
agreement between the two countries that would function as a basis for the implementation of 
any Trans-Caspian pipeline have failed to bear fruit.
171
  In addition, the status of future 
Turkmen gas supply to Europe has remained uncertain—not only because of the Caspian Sea 
boundary debates but also because of the bad investment climate in Turkmenistan and the 
effect of the world financial crisis that since 2009 has raised commodity prices and the costs 
of pipeline construction in general.
172
 
Despite the long-desired strategic prize of the establishment of Central Asian natural 
gas that would turn Azerbaijan into a key transit country (now a blurred possibility), as 
Pflüger (2012) noted, 173  even if this prize is somehow obtained it may conflict with 
Azerbaijan’s commercial interest in exporting the gas output of Umid and Absheron (now 
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predicted to be available in early 2020s). The establishment of a Trans-Caspian pipeline, 
however desirable, may pit Azerbaijani strategic interests against its commercial interests in 
exporting natural gas. Baku and Ashghabat have to agree on their respective shares of 
pipeline capacity for Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas. Although they are neighbors with 
common interests, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are also market competitors. 
 
Having considered Azerbaijan’s foreign policy relations with its current and future 
natural gas export markets, we can see that Azerbaijan’s energy-based multi-vectoral foreign 
policy basically means foreign economic policy as strategic and commercial interests are 
strongly intertwined. It is also easy to see that natural gas already plays or may play an 
important aspect in Baku’s foreign relations. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
The present thesis has addressed the issues salient to the interrelations of natural gas 
export and Azerbaijani foreign policy. Despite the fact that natural gas is still considered of 
minor significance for Azerbaijan compared to oil, I have hypothesized that its geopolitical 
and commercial implications render it of much higher importance for Baku’s foreign policy 
making than is now generally believed. In conclusion I would like to discuss whether the 
model of oil export diversification in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy may be applied to 
Azerbaijan’s natural gas export strategy.   
Natural gas has attracted major attention within the discussion of the future of energy 
production, not only because it is a cleaner source of energy than oil and coal but also 
because of its widely dispersed global location. Thanks to the prospects of wider utilization of 
unconventional gas (despite environmental concerns about hydraulic fracturing technology), 
natural gas is a relatively flexible, abundant resource for the growing international energy 
demand. The transit of natural gas, however, poses numerous challenges.  Despite the recent 
growth in liquefied natural gas trade, transit of gas in large volumes is viable mostly through 
pipelines, the buiding and maintenance of which touch upon numerous political and security 
issues. This is especially so when the exporter country is located far from the markets or is 
landlocked, which requires the cooperation of transit countries. 
Azerbaijan, a landlocked post-Soviet energy exporter country, has been determined to 
utilize energy exports in its foreign policy. When it became independent in 1991 Baku was 
79 
 
 
still in many ways dependent on Russia, the country from which it officially declared 
independence, the country that supported Armenia in the 1988–94 conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh, the country that controlled the available transit infrastructure for Azerbaijani oil 
export and the country that had been the source of Azerbaijani natural gas import. 
Iran was also a source of concern, given Tehran’s fears of Azerbaijani irredentism and 
good relations with Armenia. Since 1992 successive Azerbaijani governments have utilized 
oil and natural gas resources in order to strengthen the country’s independence and to 
stabilize its internal political and economic order. Since Heydar Aliyev’s rise to power in 
1993 Azerbaijan has followed a multi-vectoral foreign policy approach. A balanced stance 
toward all regional partners, in order to strengthen Azerbaijan’s independence, and the 
enlargement of its production and export of oil have been the key instruments of this policy. 
The so-called “Contract of the Century” in 1994 began the multi-vectoral approach 
because it opened up the large Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields for foreign (mostly Western) 
investors who brought in not only new technology and capital but also the interests backing 
governments. At the same time Russia (or part of the elite) was placated with participation in 
Lukoil. 
Since the mid-1990s Azerbaijan has worked with Turkey, Georgia and the United 
States to construct export pipeline projects to carry Azerbaijani oil separately from the 
Russian and Iranian pipeline infrastructures. Thus far, the 1999 opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Supsa oil pipeline and, more important, the 2006 opening Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
have been the key indicators of the success of this policy. The growing number of 
investments and PSAs and the implementation of transit routes have led to a surge in 
Azerbaijani oil production and to a windfall of oil revenues that has stabilized Azerbaijan’s 
independence as well as its internal economic and political order. However, the oil windfall 
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will probably be temporary because the main oil wells of ACG are expected to peak and then 
and decline in this decade. 
As a result of the discovery in 1999 of the large Shah Deniz natural gas field under the 
PSA operated by BP and Statoil, and of its production (launched in 2006), Azerbaijan has 
managed to become self-sufficient in natural gas. Thanks to the commission of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline that was constructed parallel to the BTC in early 2007, 
Azerbaijan has not only suspended natural gas imports from Russia and become completely 
independent of Russian hydrocarbon supplies, but has also begun to export natural gas to 
Georgia and Turkey. Since the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006, Azerbaijan has been 
considered by the European Union to be the keystone of its natural gas import diversification 
efforts in the Caspian region, commonly called the European Southern Gas Corridor. These 
European plans mean not only penetration of a politically non-interfering, well-paying market 
with reliable, large demand but also the possibility of becoming a transit state for Central 
Asian natural gas. As this thesis has shown, natural gas export and its diversification can be 
used for foreign policy goals in much the same ways that oil has been. 
The overlapping nature of energy policy and foreign policy making, as well as 
between commercial and strategic interests reveals the fact that energy export-related foreign 
policy implies not only strategic interests (the location of pipelines and pipeline routes), but 
also the realizable energy revenues are important both from point of view of foreign policy 
and internal policy considerations. Given the overcentralized nature of the Azerbaijani 
political system, foreign policy decisions lie with the president of Azerbaijan whereas energy 
policy decisions are made by the president with, on the one  hand, the elite groups interested 
in energy business, and on the other hand by foreign investors that operate energy production 
and transit infrastructure, most notably BP. Azerbaijan’s economy and current political order 
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are both heavily dependent on energy revenues, especially from oil that supplies the 
overwhelming majority of export revenues. Natural gas, by contrast, is expected to have an 
important share of future revenues should export to Europe and other markets be successfully 
established. Increasing natural gas revenues may even mitigate losses from the expected 
plateau and decline of oil revenues due to the expected plateau and decline of oil production. 
Foreign policy is directed to the security of energy export and maximization of revenues, 
while enregy export policy serves Baku’s multi-vectoral foreign policy.   
Baku considers Europe to be its main future market. The establishment of natural gas 
pipeline trade with Europe is strategically important for many reasons. Europe is a well-
paying market with substantial demand that is also politically non-interfering. Trade with 
Europe implies strategically not only the appearance of an important extra-regional partner in  
the Southern Caucasus through direct pipeline infrastructure, but also the possibility of 
turning Azerbaijan into a transit country of key importance. Due to the slow implementation 
of the European pipeline plans, however, Azerbaijan has broadened its multi-vectoral gas 
export policy. Baku has been compelled to export natural gas to Russia and Iran through 
existing pipelines and also to begin to look for other markets such as Syria, Ukraine and even 
Jordan. Europe remains the most desired market, however, because of its reliability of 
demand and the implications of high revenues, reliable payments and other strategic 
implications cannot be provided by any other current or possible future market. Europe would 
be the most desirable market for Azerbaijan’s future natural gas export even if the Trans-
Caspian pipeline option and the transit of Central Asian natural gas through Azerbaijan were 
in operation instead of still in the blueprint stage. 
This thesis has also shown the clear interrelations Azerbaijan’s commercial and 
strategic interests in terms of gas exports. Azerbaijan has both strategic and commercial 
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interests in the establishment of natural gas export to Europe: strategic benefits will be based 
on the direct pipeline infrastructure and the buildup of common strategic energy trade 
interests with a politically non-interfering partner; commercial benefits will accrue from a 
well-paying, large market with substantal gas demand. Azerbaijan may continue to follow a 
multi-vectoral foreign policy based on a multiple pipeline policy for both oil and gas, but 
given the inherent dependence of the natural gas trade on pipelines that must include 
cooperation with transit countries and other security implications, Europe will be the 
weighted vector in Azerbaijan’s multi-vectoralism.  
Despite the foreign policy benefits and future mitigation effect on the decline of oil 
revenues that an enlarged natural gas trade will bring, Azerbaijan’s growing natural gas 
export and natural gas revenues cannot entirely remedy the country’s structural problems. The 
economic overreliance on energy revenues is not a healthy state; nor is it sustainable given 
the underdevelopment of the non-energy sector. The Azerbaijani leadership may find a good 
way to utilize energy revenues for the transformation of the economy into one that is less 
dependent on the energy sector. If this trajectory is to be followed, however, it will require the 
enhancement of good governance, the implementation of efficient technologies and the 
development of the countryside at least as actively and thoroughly as has been promised in 
official statements.     
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